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This dissertation combines different research fields to enrich understanding of 
economic phenomena by integrating stated preference methods, experimental 
economics, and marketing.  Specifically, two laboratory experiments are designed and 
conducted to study how the number of alternatives available impacts market valuation 
studies, and how small changes in the experimental design impact honesty and trusting 
in markets with asymmetric information. 
Incentivizing has been proposed as a solution to the potential lack of candor in 
economic experiments, but how the number of alternatives available affects responses 
to incentives is uncertain.  This question is explored using induced values in a discrete 
choice experiment, merging stated preference and experimental economics.  Results 
indicate that engagement is positively correlated with profit-maximizing behavior, even 
after accounting for differences in payouts between alternatives.  The number of 
alternatives available, however, does not affect profit-maximizing behavior when the 
difference between potential payouts is small, only when the difference between 
payouts is larger does profit-maximizing behavior improve.  Results suggest that 
researchers can conduct incentivized choice experiments without all product 
alternatives available as long as participants are engaged with the task. 
The second experiment studies markets with information asymmetry.  In 
particular, how manipulating seemingly trivial aspects of a decision process influence 
honesty and trusting in an asymmetric market.  This is accomplished using a seller-




of sellers with asymmetric information is partially mitigated by the interaction of adding 
a probability of being caught lying, making truth the default option, and having self-
control available.  Results indicate that self-control depletion also reduces trusting in 
buyers.  Engagement plays an important role, with  increased engagement resulting in 
less trust by buyers and more honesty in sellers. 
A clearer picture of behavioral mechanisms in decision-making emerges by 
showing that engagement is more important than the number of alternatives available to 
promote profit-maximizing behavior.  Further, the default option, self-control, and 
probability of being caught interact to affect honesty, and that engagement is crucial in 
economic decisions.  This illustrates how behavioral economics contributes to solving 
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CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION  
 
Not so long ago, a widely shared view in various scientific circles was that some 
disciplines were inherently observational while others were experimental (Shapere 1982).  
The position of many economists was that the economics discipline was not an 
experimental field, as eloquently stated by Samuelson and Nordhaus (1985, p. 8) when 
they wrote “economists, like astronomers or meteorologists, … must be content largely to 
observe.”  The evolution of economics, however, challenges this view.  Economic 
experiments and their thought-provoking results captured the interest of many economists 
(Kagel and Roth 1995).  Early experiments conducted by Smith (1976), Plott (1982), 
Thaler (1980), and Camerer (1987), to name a few researchers that ventured in the field, 
provide examples of how experiments can play an important role in the science of 
economics.  
Insights gained through carefully designed experiments have helped improve 
economic theory on reality, generality, and tractability – aspects that Stigler (1965) pointed 
out should be used to judge theories.  In particular, behavioral economics – the subfield of 
experimental economics that relaxes rationality assumptions by using psychological 
theories – has contributed greatly to a better understanding of economic theory (Weber and 
Camerer 2006).  Behavioral economics fills a knowledge gap at the individual level of 
analysis.  At the aggregate level, economic theory explains most phenomena observed, 
while at the individual level, in contrast, economic agents may not behave as homo 





explanations for deviations from strictly rational behavior (Camerer, Loewenstein, and 
Rabin 2004).  
Two major contributions of behavioral economics have been to show (1) rational 
economic theory describes what consumers should choose, not what they choose (Thaler 
1980), and (2) the context in which the decisions are made and how choices are presented 
matter (Kahneman and Tversky 1979).  With this in mind, this dissertation shows how the 
actions that rational economic theory would predict from economic agents change when 
varying the context and presentation of decisions.  The overarching objective of this 
dissertation is to use behavioral economics to elicit candid responses in experiments 
designed to increase the understanding of economic phenomena.  This objective is 
achieved by designing and conducting two laboratory experiments that examine (1) how 
the use of monetary incentives to elicit truthful responses can be more complicated than 
just choosing between providing incentives or not, and (2) how trivial manipulations can 
be effective in moderating dishonesty in markets with information asymmetry.  The two 
studies not only take advantage of the rigor that experimental economics stresses, but also 
benefit from technological advances that help understand the phenomena being analyzed.  
This dissertation is a display of the use of interdisciplinary research to enrich the 
understanding of economic phenomena by tapping into insights from stated preference 
methods, experimental economics, and marketing.  
The Use of Incentives  
Stated preference methods are widely used to estimate the value of market and non-
market goods.  A common stated preference method is choice experiments.  Unfortunately, 





experiments.  Stated preference methods literature has proposed that the consequentiality 
of the decisions – the degree that participants perceive their choices to have consequences 
for them – reduces biases and decision errors (Carson, Groves, and List 2014).  
Meanwhile, in experimental economics and revealed preference methods it has been 
proposed that incentivizing – the use of monetary payments and/or making choices 
financially meaningful to participants – helps eliminate the lack of candid responses from 
participants in these kinds of studies, thus reducing biases and decision errors (Ding, 
Grewal, and Liechty 2005; Rakotonarivo, Schaafsma, and Hockley 2016; Penn and Hu 
2018).  There is an opportunity to merge these two streams of literature to evaluate how the 
number of alternatives (consequentiality) that are used to make choices financially 
meaningful to participants (incentivization) influences decision-making.   
In a stated preference discrete choice experiment, a series of choices are presented 
to participants and they are asked to state their preferences between the alternatives in each 
choice set by choosing one of the alternatives (Louviere 2006).  Based on the attributes, the 
attribute levels, and the choices that the participants make, the preferences of participants 
are collected, and the marginal utilities of the different attributes and attribute levels are 
estimated (Hensher 1994).  To promote candid responses using this framework, researchers 
may decide to conduct an incentivized version of a choice experiment.  Participants in an 
incentivized choice experiment (ICE) are told that one or more of the choices they make 
will be enacted and as such, it will have consequences, financial or otherwise.  The 
common practice is to randomly determine which of the choices will be enacted, but all the 
alternatives that are presented to participants are readily available to participants if they 





participants could potentially have consequences.  A setup where only some of the 
alternatives are available could change the perception of the consequentiality of 
participants and have some impact on the effectiveness of incentivization. 
The objective of chapter II is to determine whether and how the number of 
alternatives with the potential for consequences has an effect on choice behavior in 
valuation studies for private goods.  To achieve this objective, a discrete choice experiment 
is designed to determine whether the number of alternatives that could potentially have 
consequences changes participants’ profit-maximizing behavior.  Because there is a unique 
profit-maximizing alternative in each choice set, the performance of participants is 
captured objectively by evaluating when the option selected was or was not the profit-
maximizing alternative.  The effect of the number of alternatives with consequences is 
measured by randomly assigning participants into one of four treatments each with a 
different number of alternatives that could potentially have consequences.  The choice 
experiment is presented to participants on a computer screen using an eye-tracking device 
that allows for the measurement of the search behavior of participants.  The measurements 
captured with this device are used to better understand the decision-making mechanisms. 
When accounting for individual heterogeneity, consequentiality (the number of 
options that would potentially have consequences to participants) seems to lose its ability 
to predict better performance, while engagement becomes an important explanatory 
variable of profit-maximizing behavior.  Engagement remains relevant even when 
analyzing the data separately to account for differences between alternatives presented. 
These results suggest that engagement is a more accurate predictor of profit-maximizing 





the importance of increasing the relevance of the task to participants in experimental and 
valuation studies in eliciting candid responses. 
The Use of Nudges 
At the intersection of buyers and sellers with the intent to cooperate and transact, 
we find markets.  It is the case that many, if not all, markets have asymmetry in the 
information available to the parties involved.  Generally, one party knows more about the 
potential transaction than the other.  Important research questions for markets with 
asymmetric information are what conditions increase sellers' propensity to be truthful and 
what conditions make buyers more trusting.  The creativity of experimental economics and 
the behavioral considerations from marketing research are merged in Chapter III to explore 
seller and buyer behavior in markets with information asymmetry.  The study presented in 
Chapter III has the objective of finding out how nudges, seemingly innocuous 
manipulations (like having a default option or depleting the self-control of a participant), 
may affect honesty and trust in a market with asymmetric information.   
The study uses a computer-generated interactive experiment where participants are 
randomly assigned the roles of sellers and buyers to explore what conditions decrease 
(increase) lying behavior by sellers and trusting behavior by buyers.  The focus of the 
study is on nudges and behavioral conditions that may affect honesty and trust.  Nudges 
are ostensibly trivial manipulations that present options to decision-makers in such a way 
that the desired outcome is more likely to be selected.  Some nudges, for example, change 
the presentation of how the alternatives are described, like having to check a box to opt-in 





example.  This type of manipulation may seem trivial, but it has been shown to 
dramatically change outcomes (Thaler and Sunstein 2008).  
With this in mind, the study in Chapter III uses nudge manipulations to either 
promote lying or truth-telling.  In the experiment designed for this study, sellers send a 
message to buyers, a one-line sales pitch, by clicking on one of two options.  One nudge 
manipulation presents sellers with a pre-selected sales pitch.  The pre-selected message 
(default option) that sellers can send to their buyers is either a lie or the truth.  Sellers can 
then readily submit the pre-selected one-line sales pitch or change the message to the 
alternative option before submitting their sales pitch to buyers.  The prediction is that the 
nudge would lead participants to truth-telling when the default option is the truth, and steer 
participants to lie when the default message is a lie.  The effectiveness of the nudges is 
evaluated by examining if lying behavior differs when the default is the lie versus the truth.   
Another nudge manipulation used in this study is varying self-control depletion of 
participants.  Self-control is defined as the capacity to alter one’s behavior (Baumeister and 
Vohs 2007) and can be interpreted as a depletable resource (Muraven and Baumeister 
2000).  By exposing some participants, buyers and sellers alike, to a self-control depletion 
task, the differences in lying (sellers) and trusting (buyers) between those participants 
exposed to the task and those who are not exposed give a measure of the influence of self-
control depletion on behavior.   
Finally, given that the probability of being caught mitigates (or fosters) dishonest 
behavior (Bryant and Eckard 1991), this study evaluates the effect of the likelihood of 
being caught in a lie.  This behavioral condition is explored by randomly assigning some 





numerical ability of participants are measured, along with demographic controls, to gauge 
the effect of such characteristics on participant behavior. 
The results indicate that the interaction among the default option, the availability of 
self-control , and the chance of being caught matter when it comes to lying behavior of 
sellers in the market with asymmetric information.  Further, depletion of self-control has 
an effect, not only on the behavior of the sellers but also on the buyers.  Sellers are less 
likely to lie when self-control is available, there is chance of being caught lying, and the 
default message is the truth than in any other of the conditions.  At the same time, buyers 
mistrust more the messages they get from sellers when self-control has been depleted.  
Results also highlight the importance of engagement in decision-making.  Buyers’ trusting 
behavior was higher when their engagement was lower.  Sellers who were engaged with 
the task were less likely to lie. These findings also underline that how relevant the task is 







ON THE USE OF INCENTIVES: PARTIAL AND FULL INCENTIVIZATION IN 
DISCRETE CHOICE EXPERIMENTS 
 
Stated preference methods such as choice experiments are widely used for market 
and non-market valuations.  The potential exists for various biases in stated preference 
studies including response bias (Diamond and Hausman 1994), justification and policy bias 
(Bonsall 1985; Bates 1988), aggregation bias (Morrison 2000), strategic bias (Lu, Fowkes, 
and Wardman 2008), and hypothetical bias (List and Gallet 2001; Murphy et al. 2005; 
Penn and Hu 2018).  Researchers are gravitating towards methods that help mitigate 
potential biases. One such method for market valuations is the incentivized choice 
experiment (ICE) (Ding, Grewal, and Liechty 2005; Rakotonarivo, Schaafsma, and 
Hockley 2016; Penn and Hu 2018).  Contrasted to non-incentivized choice experiments, an 
ICE the participants make choices over a series of choice sets presented to them and some 
or all of these choices are acted upon.  This framework implies that there are individual 
consequences to participants stating their preferences in an ICE. 
Because of the nature of public goods – non-rival and non-exclusive (Loomis 
1996), and difficult to provide in an experimental context (Gächter and Renner 2010) – 
ICEs are not as common in the public goods valuation literature, but instead are mostly 
used in private good valuations to determine how consumers respond to new products, new 
features of existing products, or new production technologies (Hensher 1994).  New 
products or features not available in real markets, however, pose a challenge in designing 





incentivization simply because they are not available.  Given that deception is generally 
not allowed in economic experiments (Colson et al. 2016), researchers conducting ICE 
have to inform participants that some of the alternatives in the choice sets are not available.  
Consequently, the information about alternative availability may modify participants’ 
choice behavior, especially when it is uncertain whether participants fully understand the 
procedures (Cason and Plott 2014).  Furthermore, with the awareness that not all 
alternatives are available, participants may recognize not all decisions are consequential, 
which may change the perceptions of participants and how much effort they exert not only 
to understand the procedure (Bardsley 2005), but also to reveal their true preferences 
(Yang, Toubia, and de Jong 2018).  Such a lack of engagement may be exacerbated by the 
fact that ICEs are a novel task for most participants, and hence potentially limiting the 
reliability of information obtained.  The main question this study seeks to address is 
whether the participants’ behavior in ICEs differs when the number of product alternatives 
with the potential of consequences differs.   
The objective of this study is to determine whether and how the number of 
alternatives with the potential for consequences (a cash bonus payment in this study) has an 
effect on choice behavior in valuation studies for private goods.  To achieve this objective, 
an ICE is designed to gauge whether the number of alternatives with the potential for 
consequences changes participants’ profit-maximizing behavior.  The study uses the 
induced values (IV) framework to assign value to the options presented in the ICE.  
Because there is a unique profit-maximizing alternative in each choice set, the performance 
of participants is measured objectively by evaluating the deviations from the profit-





consequences is captured by randomly assigning participants into one of four treatments 
differing in the number of alternatives with potential consequences.  The ICE is presented 
to participants on a computer screen using an eye-tracking device that allows for the 
measurement of the search behavior of participants, information that could help understand 
the decision-making process better. 
Literature Review 
Probability of Enactment 
Enactment is crucial to consequentiality and economic research (Poe and Vossler 
2011).  Enactment in the context of economic experiments can be defined as the carrying 
out or putting into action the financial incentive structure to provide salient payoffs to 
participants (Hertwig and Ortmann 2001).  Consequentiality as a result of availability is at 
the crux of the possibility of enactment for private goods valuation and ICEs.  Rose and 
Hensher (2006), for example, highlight that non-availability in the market is an issue in 
constructing choice sets because the array of choice sets offered to participants may not 
represent the actual choices participants may have available in real-world settings.  Other 
authors focus on the effect of the existence or absence of products in the market (Batsell 
and Polking 1985; Raghavarao and Wiley 1986) and how to incorporate market 
(un)availability into the marginal utility estimations of choice models (Anderson and 
Wiley 1992; Lazari and Anderson 1994).   
Given the limitations to enactment in the public goods domain, research concerning 
public goods provision has been finding creative ways to measure the effect of availability 
of alternatives on decision-making and how it relates to consequentiality.  Vossler and 





differences in the voting behavior of participants between hypothetical and consequential 
voting.  The authors classify the differences in voting between conditions of hypothetical 
and consequential as decision errors.  The authors observe there are fewer errors when the 
difference between the expected payout of the public good and the cost of provision is 
larger.  Landry and List (2007) use a referendum to fund the provision of a good to all 
participants comparing the probabilities of enactment. They attempt to explore the 
difference between consequential and real by defining a “consequential” condition as a 
25% chance of enactment and a “real” condition as 50% chance of enactment.  These 
conditions are then contrasted to a hypothetical control condition with 0% chance of 
enactment.  The comparison between the consequential and real treatments found no 
differences, but they both provided different results than the hypothetical control.  Another 
study of consequentiality in a public good setting is Vossler and Evans (2009).  They use a 
referendum where a majority vote will fund a classroom recycling container.  The 
manipulation in this study conditions the enactment of the referendum on a third party.  
This third party acts as a moderator of the vote and has either 25% or 75% of the total 
votes.  Results indicate if participants perceive their votes as consequential, even when 
they are unlikely to be (as in the 75% moderator votes condition), they behave in an 
incentive-compatible way.  In a follow-up study with induced values, Collins and Vossler 
(2009) have the provisioning rule be either be majority vote, a second situation where the 
number of votes is the probability of implementation or a third scenario where a moderator 
has as many votes as all the participants.  This study is close to the present one in that 
Collins and Vossler (2009) use induced values to test the different forms of referenda, 





consequential alternatives.  Their results show that voting errors occur less frequently 
when the spread (the difference between the payments of the induced value options) is 
larger.  Finally, another study related to the present study is the work of Carson, Groves, 
and List (2014), who in a referendum for a public good provision found that increasing the 
probability of enactment  between 0, 20, 50, or 80% chance of enactment made 
participants more likely to vote in favor of the referendum in any of the non-zero chance of 
enactment versus the hypothetical (0% chance of enactment) condition. 
Although these findings are informative, there exist differences between public and 
private goods that may make findings on consequentiality in one stream of literature not 
directly transferable to the other.  One important distinction is that in public goods 
provision, enactment probabilities are not linked to the number of goods available, as there 
is one good to be distributed to every participant if the public good provision is approved 
and the vote is enacted.  The present study explores an intersection between the two bodies 
of literature by extending the findings of public goods experiments into private goods 
valuation.  This is done by exploring how enactment probabilities linked to the availability 
of the goods, affects the consequentiality of the choices, and changes the behavior of 
participants in a private good valuation setting.   
Liebe et al. (2018) showed that consequentiality matters in a private goods 
valuation setting by observing that participants facing consequences have different 
preferences than participants who are not facing consequences.  A challenge in the use of 
consequences with market goods, however, is that in many instances not all product 
alternatives presented to participants are physically available.  Certain products or features 





making large investments in product development (Hoyos 2010; de Bekker-Grob, Ryan, 
and Gerard 2012).  An important methodological question, therefore, arises: what to do 
when some of the alternatives are not readily available, making it impossible to enforce 
market institutions and provide consequences to participants’ choices?  It remains 
unexplored whether participants’ choice behavior in private good valuation changes with 
the probability of enactment as a form of consequentiality.  Given that enactment 
probability in market good valuation is based on the number of product choices available 
for purchase in an ICE, this is a gap in the literature that the present research addresses. 
Hypothetical Bias and Mitigation Techniques 
ICEs have become one of the most widely used tools in market valuation (Hess, 
Hensher, and Daly 2012).  Despite their wide use, ICEs still face strong criticism because 
of some implied assumptions regarding the behavior of participants that if violated may 
bias the results (Hensher, Rose, and Greene 2005; Janssen et al. 2017).  One assumption 
under scrutiny is whether participants’ revealed preferences are consistent with their true 
preferences (Sælensminde 2002; Ding, Grewal, and Liechty 2005; Quaife et al. 2018).  
Though there is evidence that revealed and stated preferences are similar under some 
circumstances (Haghani and Sarvi 2018), the literature suggests that this may not always 
be the case (Lusk and Schroeder 2004; Levitt and List 2007; Baltussen et al. 2012). 
Inconsistency between stated and revealed preferences is exacerbated in the 
absence of economic incentives (i.e. hypothetical bias).  List and Gallet (2001), for 
example, report an average overstatement factor of 3.16 in willingness-to-pay (WTP) 
elicitations in hypothetical versus incentivized conditions.  To address hypothetical bias, 





scales to mitigate this bias in WTP studies (Fifer, Rose, and Greaves 2014).  The 
effectiveness of cheap talk – communicating in a non-binding way with participants before 
a hypothetical choice task scenario – in reducing hypothetical bias is mixed, with some 
studies showing cheap talk reduces bias while other studies find no effect (List 2001; Lusk 
2003; Silva et al. 2011).  Another commonly used approach is honesty priming – 
participants are primed with statements that value honesty under the idea that priming tasks 
encourage individuals to be more truthful – also has mixed results (de-Magistris, Gracia, 
and Nayga 2013; Bello and Abdulai 2016).  Certainty scales that ask participants to report 
how certain they are of their stated preferences have also been documented to help mitigate 
hypothetical bias (Blomquist, Blumenschein, and Johannesson 2009).   
While such techniques may be useful in mitigating hypothetical bias, the problem 
persists.  Studies suggest that the most suitable solution for eliminating hypothetical bias is 
to use economic incentives (Brock and Durlauf 2001; Dong, Ding, and Huber 2010).  Not 
surprisingly, researchers have followed suit by using ICEs (Lusk and Schroeder 2004; 
Michaud, Llerena, and Joly 2013).  In choice experiments, incentivized or not, a series of 
choice sets are presented to participants.  To incentivize the choices in an ICE, the decision 
made in one (or more) choice set(s) has(ve) consequences.  The consequentiality in this 
context comes from the fact that participants will have to pay for and/or consume what 
they stated they would.   
Determining which choice set is the one that will have consequences is generally 
based on a random draw (Vossler, Doyon, and Rondeau 2012).  This is believed to be 
incentive-compatible under the idea that choosing randomly at least one choice set where 





their true preferences.  Because neither the participants nor the experimenters know which 
choice set(s) will become consequential, participants have the motivation to respond 
truthfully to all choice sets presented (Collins and Vossler 2009; Beck, Fifer, and Rose 
2016).  Correspondingly, not all choices have consequences because not only would it be 
costly to give every decision a consequence, but also participants buying or consuming 
products for every choice set brings up issues with decreasing marginal returns, 
complementarities, wealth effects, and unobserved strategic behavior (Knetsch 1989; 
Yang, Toubia, and de Jong 2018).  This study incentivizes the choices of participants in the 
non-hypothetical manipulations by choosing one choice randomly with the roll of a die.   
Induced Value Theory 
Exploring how any manipulation – such as the number of alternatives with the 
potential for consequences – affects behavior in choice experiments is difficult because a 
design that allows for the identification of optimal solutions a priori is necessary 
(Friedman and Sunder 1994).  If the optimal choice in every choice situation is unknown, 
the choices made may not be as informative in terms of the treatment effects, as the 
choices observed could be the result of preference heterogeneity rather than treatments 
(Greene and Hensher 2013).  One design tool that may address this issue is the induced 
values (IV) framework (Coursey, Hovis, and Schulze 1987; Taylor et al. 2001; Braga and 
Starmer 2005).  With this framework, the “goods” being offered to participants are given 
an induced value by the experimenter, and the goods have no inherent value to participants, 
the goods only have the worth that experimenters inform participants (Smith 1976).   
IV theory proposes that, in a controlled experiment, the decision between options is 





researcher can unequivocally account for and measure how choices presented differ and 
uses random assignment of treatments, causal inferences can be made (Antonakis et al. 
2010).  If the experimenter, for example, knows which of the choices provides the largest 
monetary payoff, inferences can be made about how the treatments affect the profit-
maximizing behavior of participants (Paul 1982).  This study takes advantage of the 
properties of the IV framework to evaluate the effect of the number of alternatives with 
consequences on choice behavior in ICEs.  By knowing which option presented to 
participant is the one with the largest payoff and making the reasonable assumption that 
the preferences of participants are increasingly monotonic on money – more money is 
preferred to less money – the IV design allows for identification of decision errors and a 
measure of performance in this study. 
Aspects Affecting Effectiveness in the Use of Incentives 
In economic experiments, treatment effects manifest if the treatments are relevant 
and noticeable to the participants (Bardsley 2005).  When participants fail to correctly 
identify the game being played, their decisions are not connected to the consequences of 
their actions (Chou et al. 2009; Herriges et al. 2010; Vossler, Doyon, and Rondeau 2012; 
Vossler and Watson 2013; Cason and Plott 2014).  Participants’ cognitive ability can 
impede or enable identification of the optimal course of action (Robinson 1998; Banks, O ’ 
Dea, and Oldfield 2010; Alós-Ferrer et al. 2012; Chen et al. 2012; Kløjgaard, Bech, and 
Søgaard 2012).  Numeracy, broadly defined as “…the ability to process basic probability 
and numerical concepts…” is one cognitive ability that has drawn attention in this context 
(Peters et al. 2006, p. 407).  Participants who possess low numeracy skills may be less 





Subjective measures of numeracy have the benefit of measuring ability without 
imposing an additional cognitive load on participants.  The main shortcoming of subjective 
measures is that they are self-reported measures and may not necessarily correlate with 
actual numerical abilities (Dunning, Heath, and Suls 2004).  In contrast, objective 
measures do not have this shortcoming, although they may be taxing cognitively (Grebitus 
and Davis 2019).  In this study, an objective measure of numerical ability is employed 
using questions originally developed by Schwartz et al. (1997) and adapted from Weller et 
al. (2013). 
Participants in an ICE may also fail to recognize the saliency of incentives because 
they are simply not engaged with the task (Börger 2016).  Levels of engagement with the 
choice task in ICEs result in participants systematically using or ignoring information, 
leading to choices that may not necessarily reflect their true preferences (Hensher, Rose, 
and Greene 2012; Hole, Kolstad, and Gyrd-Hansen 2013; Scarpa et al. 2013).  Two 
methods are used to measure engagement in this study. One uses biometrics, which will be 
discussed in the next section.  The other one is a test consisting of three questions, the 
cognitive reflection test (CRT) proposed by Frederick (2005).   
A higher score in the CRT indicates a higher reflective state, albeit not necessarily 
a higher level of cognitive ability (Hoppe and Kusterer 2011).  Studies on the use of CRT 
in decision-making show that higher levels of CRT have a positive effect on judgment and 
making better choices (Campitelli and Labollita 2010; Toplak, West, and Stanovich 2011), 
but it has not been used commonly in the context of ICEs.  It is important to highlight that 
when Frederick (2005) proposed the CRT, he intended to measure the ability to resist 





deliberately.  Research on the interpretation of CRT scores has suggested that a higher 
score indicates a higher degree of engagement to the task at hand.  The ability to reflect on 
a decision has been shown to come from the ability of participants to engage in analytical 
processing (Pennycook, Fugelsang, and Koehler 2015).  This is the context where CRT is 
used as a measure of engagement throughout this document.  When participants in the 
studies score high in the CRT, they are engaging in analytical thinking with the task at 
hand. 
Eye Tracking Measurements 
It is the case that in experiments like the one conducted in this study, regardless of 
whether incentives are present or not, the responses are self-reports of participants.  The 
use of incentives, as described earlier, is aimed to get participants to reveal their true 
preferences and provide candid responses.  The effectiveness of different techniques to get 
candor from participants in their responses is still under scrutiny (Sælensminde 2002).  It is 
the case, however, that the physiological responses of individuals are harder to fake 
(Houston and Holmes 1975) and can be trusted generally as truthful responses (Proverbio, 
Vanutelli, and Adorni 2013).  Economic research can benefit from using biometrics to 
measure participants' responses (Camerer, Loewenstein, and Prelec 2005).  The use of 
biometrics enables researchers to explore elements in the behavior of decision-makers in a 
non-intrusive way (Gilmore and Erdem 2008; Kaplinski and Tupenaite 2011), which is 
why this study uses an eye-tracking device.   
Eye-tracking devices like the one used in this study are a set of high-resolution 
infrared cameras that follow participants’ eye movements on a screen (TobiiAB 2015) 





perusing and moving between stimuli, distance to the screen, and, depending on the device, 
other measures related to visualization of the stimuli (Khushaba et al. 2013).  Using eye-
tracking in economics is not new, but is gaining popularity as the technology becomes 
more accessible (Reutskaja et al. 2011; Lahey and Oxley 2016).  Eye-tracking usage spans 
many different decision-making aspects including fatigue (Louviere 2006), point of 
purchase behavior (Rasch, Louviere, and Teichert 2015), attribute non-attendance in 
choice experiments (Balcombe, Burton, and Rigby 2011; Chavez, Palma, and Collart 
2017), and time spent on a choice (Maughan, Gutnikov, and Stevens 2007).  Pupil dilation, 
a metric obtained in eye-tracking, is the second measurement of engagement used in this 
study since pupil dilation has been documented to be an indicator of engagement (Hoeks 
and Levelt 1993; Einhäuser et al. 2008; Wang, Spezio, and Camerer 2010).  Previous 
studies have shown that, in the presence of economic incentives, engagement is enhanced 
(Small et al. 2005) even when participants have no prior experience with the task (Heslin 
and Johnson 1992).  Using eye-tracking to measure pupil dilation in the context of this 
study is a helpful instrument to verify whether the number of alternatives with 
consequences has an effect on engagement in decision-making in ICEs. 
Methodology 
Experimental Design 
The experiment is conducted using 152 general population participants (non-
students) recruited through local newspaper ads in College Station, Texas.  Participants are 
randomly assigned to one of four treatment conditions: hypothetical control, partial 





The experimental design uses a similar idea to the one developed in the IV 
experiment of Luchini and Watson (2014).  Each participant is shown 12 choice sets with 
two alternatives and an opt-out option.  The alternatives presented to participants to choose 
from are shapes of different colors.  The value of each shape/color combination depends on 
three attributes: price to purchase, shape, and color.  Four purchase prices are included: 
$0.50, $1.00, $1.50, and $2.00.  The values of each of the three different shapes 
(square=$0.50, triangle=$1.00, and circle=$1.50) and the two different colors 
(green=$0.50 and blue=$1.00) differ.  This setup then has three attributes, with four, three, 
and two levels each, which produce a total of 24 different combinations of color, shape, 
and price.  Profits are calculated as the sum of the shape and color values minus the 
purchasing price.  For example, a blue circle at a purchase price of $1.00 has a profit of 
$1.50 (blue [$1.00] + circle [$1.50] – price [$1.00]).   
In each pair, one alternative maximizes profits.  The difference in profits between 
low- and high-paying shape was $0.50 for seven pairs, $1.50 for four pairs, and $2.50 for 
one pair of shapes.  In this IV design, choosing the largest paying alternative for each 
choice set is the optimal strategy for maximizing profits.  Further, every pair has at least 
one alternative with non-negative profits.  In two of the choice sets, the profit-maximizing 
alternative had a payout of $0, while the other alternative yielded a negative payoff.  These 
choice sets are included as attention checks.  See Appendices A and B for an example of a 
choice set presented and the instructions given to participants.  The experimental design 
was developed in Ngene with a final D-error of 0.1492 (ChoiceMetrics 2014).   
A total of 12 choice sets that include all possible 24 alternatives are presented to 





The main difference across the treatments is the number of alternatives with consequences.  
In a traditional non-incentivized choice experiment, none of those 24 alternatives would 
have consequences.  Therefore, in the hypothetical control, participant’s choices are 
hypothetical and none of the choice sets is selected for payment.  In the other three 
treatments, participants are informed that one of the alternatives they choose will be used 
for a bonus payment.  In an ICE, all the 24 alternatives could potentially have 
consequences.  Therefore, the full availability treatment is equivalent to the common 
practice in ICE – all 24 alternatives can potentially be consequential. 
For the partial availability treatments, the procedure to inform participants about 
the number of alternatives with potential consequences is designed such that participants 
possess full information about how many alternatives can have consequences and showing 
participants that the experimenters possess the same level of information as they do.  Each 
of the 24 alternatives was written down on a piece of paper.  For each treatment, 
participants are informed that n randomly selected alternatives are to be placed inside a box 
to be eligible to become consequential.  The number of alternatives placed inside the box 
corresponds to the treatment assignment (8 or 16). That is, the partial availability – low 
condition had eight alternatives with consequences, while the partial availability – high 
condition had 16 alternatives with consequences.  The box containing the selected 
alternatives was placed next to the participant to ensure that the number of alternatives 
with consequences was salient.  To preserve incentive compatibility, participants did not 
find out which alternatives were inside the box until the end of the experiment.  After 
reading the instructions, subjects completed a practice round.  Results of the practice round 





Table 1: Summary of Choices Enacted in Each Treatment Condition 
Treatment Number of available alternatives 
Probability of an 
alternative is available 
Hypothetical control 0 0% 
Partial availability – low 8 33% 
Partial availability – high 16 66% 




Once participants had no more questions and verifying they remembered and 
understood the payout structure, they advanced to the choice task stage.  After completing 
the choice task, subjects filled a survey consisting of demographic questions, a numeracy 
skill quiz adapted from Weller et al. (2013), and the CRT (Frederick 2005).  The complete 
survey instrument including the scales can be found in Appendix C. 
To incentivize the responses, participants are given the profit they made on a 
randomly selected choice set as discussed as a bonus to their $20 compensation for 
participating in all treatment conditions except the hypothetical control.  The procedure to 
get the bonus was as follows.  Upon completing the survey at the end of the study, subjects 
rolled the 12-sided die to determine the prize choice set.   
To receive the bonus, the alternative a participant chose in the prize choice set had 
to be inside the box.  In the full availability condition, since all 24 alternatives are inside 
the box, participants are guaranteed to receive a bonus payment based on the die roll and 
their chosen alternative.  In the partial availability conditions, only 8 or 16 of the 
alternatives have randomly been placed in the box for the bonus payment.  The number of 
potentially consequential alternatives and chances of getting a bonus in each treatment are 





Participants are not guaranteed to receive a bonus payment in the partial availability 
conditions.  The bonus payment depends on three aspects: the alternative chosen by the 
participant, the die roll, and whether the alternative is inside the box, i.e. if the alternative 
has consequences.  The combination of the probability of enactment (determined by the die 
roll) and the probability of the selected option being available (determined by the random 
alternative selection) can be interpreted by participants as a compound lottery (Samuelson 
1952; Segal 1990).  Random payment systems that take the form of compound lotteries of 
this nature can generate distortions to how incentives are interpreted by participants, and 
alter the preference revealing properties of an incentive-compatible setup (Azrieli, 
Chambers, and Healy 2018).  Research on the ability of random payment mechanisms of 
this sort has shown, however, that as long as researchers can safely assume that preferences 
of participants are monotonic, that one option pays more than the alternative (defined as a 
state-wise monotonicity condition), and the choices are not presented all at the same time, 
the incentive compatibility of the mechanism holds (Azrieli, Chambers, and Healy 2018; 
Brown and Healy 2018).  In this study, each choice is presented separately in different 
screens, the state-wise monotonicity condition is satisfied, and the assumption that 
participants are profit-maximizers with monotonically increasing preferences over profits 
is made.  These conditions imply that the bonus payment would be incentive compatible.  
The experiment is presented as a slide show on a computer.  The order of the 
choice sets is randomized for each participant to control for ordering effects.  To balance 
the position presentation, the largest-paying alternative is the option on the left in half of 
the choice sets and on the right for the other half.  Between choice sets a slide with a bull’s 





re-center the attention of participants and help avoid previous choice bias.  Participants 
spend as much time as needed on the choice sets.  The experiment is conducted in a 
laboratory with no windows, using fluorescent light of 750 lumens and 6500 Kelvin color 
temperature to light the room, thus keeping luminosity constant across participants, an 
important consideration for comparison of pupil dilation.   
The iMotions platform (iMotions 2018) is used to display the choice sets on a 1920 
x 1200 pixel screen using a Tobii TX-300 screen-based eye tracking device.  The eye 
tracking device is embedded in the computer screen, tracking and recording eye 
movements using near-infrared technology at a sampling rate of 120 data points per 
second.  At the beginning of the experiment, the eye tracking device is calibrated to ensure 
proper data collection for each individual using a nine-point calibration method.  To 
analyze the eye movements of participants, areas of interest (AOI) on the slides with the 
choice sets are defined.  These AOIs were polygons (rectangles) that include the shapes, 
the price for each shape, and the opt-out choice.  Five AOIs per choice set were 
constructed.  Because the slides are symmetric, the AOIs are also symmetric and 
equidistant.  Fixation data from the AOIs are used for the analysis of the eye-tracking 
metrics of participants. 
Research Hypotheses 
Based on the experimental design and manipulations, four hypotheses are 
formulated.  Although not stated, the respective alternative hypotheses cover all possible 





Hypothesis 1: There is a significant effect of the number of available choices with the 
potential for consequences on the performance of participants (selecting the profit-
maximizing alternative) in ICE. 
The literature documents the benefits of using incentives in ICE (Collins and 
Vossler 2009; Cerroni et al. 2019).  The design allows measuring the effect of the number 
of choices with consequences on a participant’s behavior in a controlled environment.  
More choices with the potential for consequences may increase the saliency and relevance 
of the task to participants.   
Hypothesis 2: There is an increase in performance in the choice task as the number of 
alternatives with the potential for consequences increases. 
This hypothesis builds on hypothesis 1 by providing a direction and magnitude to 
the effect.  If there is support for this hypothesis, users of ICE may want to have as many 
alternatives with consequences as possible to ensure participants engage with the 
experimental task and reveal their preferences. 
Hypothesis 3: A larger number of choices with the potential with consequences in ICE 
changes participants’ visual behavior. 
Previous literature has shown that time spent perusing a choice and search 
behaviors within choice sets are predictors of decisions (Shi, Wedel, and Pieters 2013).  
Changes in the visual behavior measured with eye-tracking technology are compared 
across treatments.  Support for this hypothesis implies that not only the outcomes, as in 
hypothesis 1 but also the cognitive processes vary with the number of choices with the 





Hypothesis 4a: Better numerical ability increases performance in ICE regardless of the 
number of choices with the potential for consequences. 
Hypothesis 4b: Better cognitive reflection increases performance in ICE regardless of the 
number of choices with the potential for consequences. 
Previous findings indicate higher numerical ability and engagement increase 
performance (Robinson 1998; Kløjgaard, Bech, and Søgaard 2012).  The experimental 
design allows for exploring the extent to which choice behavior is robust regarding 
variations in numerical skills and engagement with the task when different numbers of 
alternatives with the potential for consequences are tested. 
Econometric Modeling 
The analysis quantifies the magnitude of the effect of the number of alternatives 
with the potential for consequences on the probability of participants making profit-
maximizing choices, controlling for demographics, numeracy skills, CRT scores, and eye-
tracking metrics.  The binary nature of the outcome, either picking the profit-maximizing 
choice or not, allows for modeling the choices with the multinomial logit model (Greene 
2012).  Because participants make selections across choice sets, the data have a panel 
structure.  In this setup, individual characteristics of participants – observed and 
unobserved – remain constant across choice sets and are unrelated to the choice sets.  It 
follows from the independence of irrelevant alternatives and the lack of variation of 
participant characteristics that the choice sets can be used as panel units (Train 2009; 
Greene and Hensher 2010).  With the panel structure then a random-effects specification of 





The model specification selected for the analysis is a random-effects logit.  A panel 
structure of the data implies that there is an unobserved effect of participants having to 
make choices over the 12 choice sets.  In a fixed-effects model, the unobserved effect 
across panel units can be arbitrarily correlated with the explanatory variables, while 
assuming strict exogeneity of the explanatory variables.  If this assumption does not hold, 
the fixed-effects estimator is biased.  Furthermore, if the unobserved effect across panel 
units is uncorrelated with the explanatory variables, the fixed-effects model is an 
inefficient estimator.  With the assumption of IIA, the unobserved effect across choice sets 
is left as part of the error term of the model.  With this condition, the random-effects model 
produces a consistent estimator that accounts for the fact that there is a positive correlation 
between the error terms of the individual choice and the unobserved error across all choice 
sets.  This estimator is also more efficient than the fixed-effects model. 
The specification used in the analysis has the option selected as dependent variable 
(1 if it is the profit-maximizing option, 0 otherwise), conditional on the number of 
alternatives with consequences (qualitative 0/1 variables for each manipulation condition), 
participants’ numeracy and CRT scores, average time spent perusing the choice set, 
average pupil dilation across choice sets, and demographic information.  The numeracy 
and CRT scores are interpreted as discrete variables, thus incorporating the assumption that 
there is a non-linear response to the scores.  Treating the scale values as discrete also 
allows for higher stability to the measure (Svensson 2000).  To incorporate the scale values 
in the estimation, individual qualitative variables (0/1 for each scale value) are included in 
the model.  The estimation imposes the constraint that the sum of the parameter estimates 





Demographics included are a 0/1 qualitative variable for gender (female being 1), 
the age of participants in years, the reported yearly household income (converted to hourly 
income assuming a 40-hour workweek), and a 0/1 qualitative outcome variable for having 
a college education (college education being 1).  To help account for heteroskedasticity 
and the variation between individuals, the model is estimated with robust standard errors. 
Sample 
Summary statistics of the demographic variables collected are given in table 2.  
Seven participants did not follow the instructions and are excluded from the analyses.  A 
balanced Mann and Whitney (1947) – MW – test comparing the demographics across 
treatments found no statistically significant differences (p > 0.05) except for gender.  The 
partially incentivized treatments had fewer females than the other two treatment 
conditions.  Although the sample is balanced across the treatments, it is not representative 
of the general population.   The proportions of individuals across demographics do not 
match those of the U.S. or the local area where the study was conducted.  It could be 
argued that this compromises the findings of the study.  Given that the study is testing 
human behavior differences between the sample and the population do not preclude 
findings from being informative.   
Furthermore, the objectives of the study, do not aspire to provide policy 
recommendations, which would benefit from a representative sample, but rather the study 
aims to inform practitioners of ICEs and market valuation.  More importantly, random 
assignment of participants to the treatments ensures causal inferences on the economic 






Table 2: Summary of Individual Characteristics in the Sample 
 Treatment All Local US 
Variable 0% 33% 66% 100%    
Median age 36.0 26.0 26.5 29.0 29.0 27.4 38.1 
 (2.32) (1.60) (2.51) (2.77) (1.18)   
Yearly household income (‘000s) 65.91 60.95 67.19 64.35 64.47 45.52 64.35 
 (7.01) (7.27) (7.97) (7.01) (3.63)   
Females (%) 75.00 55.26 57.89 71.88 64.558 49.70 50.80 
 (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (4.00)   
College degree (%) 100.0 97.44 92.11 96.88 96.55 36.10 56.20 
 (0.00) (0.03) (0.04) (0.08) (0.02)   
White (%) 61.11 56.41 71.05 71.88 64.83 56.80 60.60 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.04)   
Numeracy score (max 5) 4.00 4.15 3.84 3.31 3.85   
 (0.18) (0.16) (0.19) (0.25) (0.10)   
CRT score (max 3) 0.94 1.36 1.05 0.83 1.01   
 (0.20) (0.19) (0.19) (0.18) (0.10)   
Number of participants 36 39 38 32 145   




Results and Discussion 
The Effect of Product Availability on Performance 
The present study sets out to evaluate whether the number of alternatives with the 
potential for consequences in an ICE affects the choice behavior of participants in a private 
goods setting, formally expressed in Hypothesis 1.  By comparing the proportion of profit-
maximizing choices in each treatment, the effect of the number of alternatives with the 
potential for consequences on choice is measured.  The average proportions of optimal 
choices for all the 145 participants of the sample in each of the treatments are summarized 
in table 3.  Comparing the proportion of optimal choices in each treatment condition using 
the MW test shows that the only treatment condition with a statistically smaller percentage 





Table 3: Summary of Optimal Choices and Eye-tracking Metrics in Each Condition 
  Measure 








Hypothetical  60.18a* 1.79a 3.09a* 3.74a* 
  (4.32) (0.08)  (0.03) 
Partial availability – low  67.09b 1.85a 2.22b 4.17b 
  (3.03) (0.07)  (0.03) 
Partial availability – high  65.13b 1.74a 1.88b 4.08bc* 
  (4.10) (0.06)  (0.03) 
Full availability  65.36b 1.86a 2.91b 3.95c* 
  (4.19) (0.09)  (0.04) 
Statistical tests of every treatment against each treatment individually. 
Standard errors in parentheses.  The same letters by column indicate values are not 




The percentages of optimal choices are not statistically different in any of the other 
treatment conditions (p > 0.05).  This result indicates that having any number of choices 
with consequences in an ICE versus a hypothetical choice experiment improves the 
performance of participants, supporting Hypothesis 1.  This result aligns with the findings 
of Collins and Vossler (2009), who using an IV framework in a public goods provision 
experiment found that as long as there are incentives with real consequences, participants 
improve their performance. 
The results do not provide support to Hypothesis 2: increasing the number of 
alternatives with the potential for consequences does not seem to affect the probability of 
selecting the profit-maximizing alternative.  There are no statistical differences in the 
percentage of optimal choices between a different number of alternatives with the potential 
for consequences.  A visual representation of the effect of the number of alternatives with 







Figure 1. Average and 95% confidence interval of optimal choices made for the different 




The average percentage of optimal choices with the different number of alternatives 
with the potential for consequences and the 95% confidence intervals are plotted in Figure 
1.  This result is in line with the findings of Yang, Toubia, and de Jong (2018), who 
showed that participants do not respond to the potential enactment of their choices in a 
monotonic manner. 
Behavior and Engagement 
To test Hypothesis 3, the visual attention measures collected using an eye-tracker 
are used.  First, the total visit duration (TVD) across treatments is compared.  TVD is the 
measure of the time participants spend looking at the AOIs in each choice set.  This eye-
























None 8 16 24





differences in TVD between stimuli may exist because of inherent differences between 
stimuli rather than the treatment variables (Orquin and Holmqvist 2018).  In this study, the 
choice sets – the stimuli – are identical across all treatments, thus minimizing the issues of 
using TVD as a metric.  Furthermore, the purpose of using TVD is to measure whether 
participants are willing to invest more time evaluating the choice sets with a different 
number of alternatives with potential for consequences.   
The mean TVD by treatment is summarized in table 3.  The average of TVD by 
treatment is not statistically different (MW p > 0.05).  Ratio tests (Brown and Forsythe 
1974) on the variances of TVD (table 3) reveal that the variance of TVD in the 
hypothetical condition is larger than any of the incentivized treatments (p < 0.05), while 
variances of TVD in each of the incentivized treatments are not statistically different 
between each other (p > 0.05).  These results suggest that, on average, participants behave 
similarly in terms of the average time they spend evaluating each choice, whether 
incentives are present or not.  In the hypothetical case, however, search patterns are more 
erratic and have a larger distribution, which provides some support for Hypothesis 3. 
Pupil size is used as an indicator of engagement with the task.  A large difference in 
variation between choice sets would bar the use of an aggregate measure of pupil dilation 
(Hoeks and Levelt 1993).  Tests for variation across choice sets show no significant 
differences (p > 0.05) and the random order of presentation helps account for any inherent 
variation between the choice sets.  An aggregate measure of pupil dilation across choice 
sets, therefore, is used to compare the treatment effects.  The mean pupil dilation in 
millimeters is shown in the last column in table 3.  Differences in pupil dilation, just as the 





participants are identical across treatments, the only difference between is the number of 
choices with the potential for consequences.  With equally complex stimuli across 
treatments, differences in pupil dilation are interpreted as the task deemed more relevant by 
the participants.  Pupil dilation is statistically smaller in the hypothetical treatment 
condition relative to any of the incentivized treatments (p < 0.05).  This result serves as a 
biometric indicator of higher engagement in the incentivized conditions. 
Individual Characteristics’ Effect on the Reaction to Incentives 
Next, the effects of variations on numerical ability and cognitive reflection on 
decision-making are examined (Hypotheses 4a and 4b).  The distribution of the scores in 
the numeracy scale is skewed to the right in every treatment.  The median and proportions 
of participants above and below the median, however, are not statistically different 
between treatments.  This allows for a comparison of the effect of numeracy across 
treatments, given the sample balance.  The percentages of optimal choices for each value 
of the numeracy score are plotted in Figure 2.  The increasing trend suggests a positive 
relationship between numerical ability and optimal choices, thus supporting Hypothesis 4a.   
A closer look at the relationship between numeracy and profit-maximizing choices 
is provided by looking at the percentage of optimal choices that each treatment group had 
across the numeracy scale (table 4).  Across all incentivized treatments, increased 
numeracy scores generally lead to better performance, although the relationship does not 









Figure 2. Percentage of optimal choices and a 95% confidence interval by numeracy score 




The distribution of CRT scores across treatments is skewed towards the left, with 
over half of the participants scoring zero.  Once again, tests of medians and proportions 
across treatments find no differences between treatments, allowing a comparison of the 
effect of CRT across treatments.  The proportion of optimal choices and the 95% 
confidence intervals by CRT scores are plotted in Figure 3.  A significant difference exists 
in the optimal choice percentage between participants who score zero and those that scored 
above zero.  The percentages of optimal choice between participants who score between 1 































Table 4. Summary of Optimal Choices in Each Treatment for Each Value of the 
Numeracy and Cognitive Reflection Scales 
  Optimal Choice (%) 
  Numeracy score  Cognitive reflection score 
Treatment  0 1 2 3 4 5  0 1 2 3 
Hypothetical  n/a 41.66 77.79 66.67 52.08 59.52  57.02 55.00 51.67 75.00 
   (0.01) (0.10) (0.14) (0.07) (0.07)  (0.06) (0.15) (0.07) (0.12) 
Partial availability – low  n/a 25.00 25.00 71.67 69.87 70.83  60.42 70.83 70.14 69.05 
   (0.01) (0.08) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04)  (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) 
Partial availability – high  n/a 66.67 52.78 60.71 60.90 74.36  56.14 75.00 71.97 78.33 
   (0.17) (0.20) (0.10) (0.08) (0.06)  (0.06) (0.10) (0.07) (0.07) 
Full availability  0.25 54.17 65.48 68.06 56.25 80.21  58.71 83.33 80.56 75.00 
  (0.00) (0.21) (0.08) (0.11) (0.08) (0.06)  (0.05) (0.16) (0.09) (0.01) 
Standard errors in parentheses. No participants are in the zero scores in the numeracy 







































Evaluating the percentage of optimal choices for each treatment group by CRT 
scale scores (table 4) reveal patterns that support Hypothesis 4b.  Participants in the 
incentivized treatments with CRT scores greater than zero (the last three columns in table 
4) perform better than those with zero scores.  However, participants in the hypothetical 
treatment only perform well when their CRT score is at its maximum.  Participants in the 
hypothetical condition with the largest CRT score generally perform as well as participants 
in the incentivized conditions.   
The implication is that participants who are engaged – given higher scores in CRT 
signal higher engagement in analytical processing (Toplak, West, and Stanovich 2011) – 
may not need incentives to perform well, while unengaged participants – lowest CRT score 
– may not react to incentives, regardless of the number of available alternatives. 
Econometric Evaluation of the Interaction Between Treatments and Behavior  
To test for the effects of treatment conditions and behavioral aspects 
simultaneously, three different specifications of a random-effects logit model are estimated 
(table 5) using the xtlogit command in Stata (StataCorp 2015).  The first model estimates 
the changes in the likelihood of choosing the profit-maximizing option with different 
numbers of alternatives with the potential for consequences, relative to the hypothetical 
condition of using only qualitative indicator variables for the treatments.  A second model 
includes the results of the numeracy and CRT scales.  Finally, a third specification includes 
pupil dilation, TVD, age, gender, hourly income, and college education as controls.  
Correlations between the variables do not suggest multicollinearity problems in the data.  






Table 5.  Random-Effects Panel Logit Estimation of the Likelihood of Making the 
Optimal Choice Results 
   Model  
Variable 1 2 3 
Partial availability –low 0.331** (0.144) 0.317** (0.139) 0.189 (0.151) 
Partial availability – high 0.228* (0.132) 0.255 (0.164) 0.247 (0.178) 
Full availability 0.270** (0.116) 0.345** (0.152) 0.269 (0.151) 
       
Numeracy score       
1   0.018 (0.186) 0.369*** (0.150) 
2   0.238 (0.150) 0.194 (0.157) 
3   0.354*** (0.109) 0.325*** (0.123) 
4   0.054 (0.112) -0.068 (0.085) 
5   0.336*** (0.089) 0.181*** (0.099) 
       
CRT score       
1   0.290*** (0.085) 0.317*** (0.106) 
2   0.223** (0.126) 0.312** (0.124) 
3   0.487*** (0.134) 0.381*** (0.089) 
       
TVD     0.206*** (0.072) 
Pupil dilation     0.110 (0.081) 
       
Demographics       
Age     -0.015*** (0.005) 
Female      0.124 (0.145) 
Hourly income     -0.006** (0.003) 
College Education     0.241 (0.217) 
       
Constant 0.051 (0.097) -0.339 (0.089) -0.628 (0.668) 
       
N 1572 1572  1572  
Log-likelihood -1057.31  -1043.48  -1016.41  
AIC 2122.64  2110.95  2054.83  
BIC 2144.08  2175.27  2113.79  
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% is denoted by 





Because the estimation of the parameters for the different variables required 
dropping incomplete observations, observations without complete demographic 





leaves 1572 observations1.  As it generally is the case in econometric estimations, there are 
potential problems associated with the choice of model specification used.  As a robustness 
check, other specifications were estimated, including fixed-effects models with standard 
errors clustered at the choice level, and linear probability models.  Each specification 
varies in the assumptions they make and whether such assumptions may or may not be 
valid or relevant.  A similar pattern in the direction and magnitude of the estimated 
coefficients is seen across all models.  To illustrate the similarity of results, the linear 
probability model estimation results are presented in Appendix D.  The main differences 
found between the results of the linear probability models and the random-effect 
specifications are in the parameter estimates for the number of alternatives with the 
potential for consequences. 
The parameter estimates for the different numbers of alternatives with the potential 
for consequences are not statistically different between each other (p > 0.05) in either of 
the specifications, but in the linear probability models all incentivized conditions are 
statistically significant when accounting for numeracy and attention (model 2), versus in 
the random-effects model the partial availability – high is not statistically significant and 
the full availability condition is statistically different from zero when also accounting for 
demographics (model 3), while in the random-effects model none of the incentivized 
conditions is.   
 
1 The estimation of models 1 and 2 without dropping the observations with missing data yields the same 
significance and direction in the results. The comparative statistics were also calculated with the subsample 





The results of model 1 indicate that partial availability – low and the full 
availability treatments increase the likelihood of choosing the profit-maximizing option 
relative to the hypothetical treatment.  In model 2 the highest level of numerical ability and 
all non-zero degrees of engagement (CRT) have significant positive effects.  In model 2, 
partial availability – low and full availability treatments still have a statistically significant 
effect improving the likelihood of profit-maximizing choices relative to the hypothetical 
control.  The parameter estimates for the different treatments, however, are not statistically 
different between each other (p > 0.05).  The results of model 2 also show that numerical 
ability may or may not increase the profit-maximizing choice chance, while any non-zero 
degree of engagement (measured with CRT) has a significant positive effect in increasing 
the probability of participants making profit-maximizing choices. 
Inferences about treatment effects differ when controlling for demographics and 
visual attention in model 3.  Numeracy is once again significant at some levels but not 
others.  Meanwhile, all levels of engagement are statistically significant and positive when 
demographic controls included in the estimation.  Visual attention captured by TVD has a 
positive and significant effect, implying that participants that spent more time perusing the 
choice sets were more likely to make optimal choices.  The estimate for pupil dilation, 
which was statistically different between hypothetical and incentivized conditions in the 
statistical inference analysis, is not significant.  This result indicates that while engagement 
may be driving optimal choice behavior by participants, the physiological measure does 
not show any differences.  Hourly income is statistically significant and negative.  The 
direction of the parameter is reasonable, as participants with larger opportunity costs would 





model 3 is that when adding visual metrics and demographics to the model, none of the 
incentivized treatments is statistically different from the hypothetical control in increasing 
the likelihood of making optimal choices. 
To explore if there are systematic biases in the participants’ decision-making, 
willingness to pay (WTP) for each of the attributes is estimated.  To estimate WTP, a 
random parameter logit model in WTP space (Train and Weeks 2005) is estimated, with 
the color, shape, and price of each choice as independent variables, the actual choice as the 
dependent variable, and the panel unit being the choice set.  In models in WTP space, the 
utility function is reparametrized such that each attribute coefficient estimate is interpreted 
directly as the WTP for the attribute.   
The model uses green and square as the baselines for color and shape.  With this 
setup, the WTP for each attribute represents how much more the participants would be 
willing to pay relative to the baseline.  For example, for the color blue, the WTP relative to 
the baseline should be $0.50, because as noted earlier the value of the color green is $0.50, 
and the value for the color blue is $1.00.  The WTP estimates are compared to the actual 
value of the attributes using a 𝜒𝜒2 test (table 6).  Test results indicate the WTP estimates are 
not statistically different from the actual values of the attributes, except for the WTP 
estimate for triangle under partial availability – high.  These results suggest no systemic 






Table 6.  WTP for the Different Attributes in Each Treatment Condition Using a 
Random Parameters Panel Logit Estimation in WTP Space 
 Treatment 
Attribute Hypothetical Partial – Low Partial – High Full  
Circle ($1.00) $1.33 $1.08 $1.55 $0.94 
     
Triangle ($0.50)  $1.25 $0.42 $1.33* $0.65 
     
Blue ($0.50) $0.10 $0.28 $0.62 $0.40 
     





The econometric estimation results (table 5) are not entirely consistent with the 
statistical results discussed earlier.  Comparative statistical inference results suggested that 
the average of profit-maximizing choices is significantly different between the hypothetical 
control and the incentivized treatments but are not statistically different between 
incentivized treatments.  Differences between comparative statistics and econometric 
results beg the question as to why.  Payout differences in each choice set may help explain 
the results.  Prior research using the IV framework suggests that decision errors are related 
to payout differences (Taylor et al. 2001; Vossler and McKee 2006).  As described in the 
methods section, the differences in payoffs between alternatives in each choice set are 
either $0.50 (7 out of 12) or more than $0.50 (5 out of 12).  Given that all participants were 
presented with the same choice sets, the variation in the payoff is the same across 
participants2.  The variance coming from differences in payouts might be obscuring the 
effect of the number of alternatives with the potential for consequences.  To examine if 
 
2 Because differences in payoffs are collinear with the choice sets, a model including an estimator for the 
effect of the differences is limited to a logit model and not a panel logit.  Estimation results of the logit model 





payoff matters, the proportion of optimal choices and model 3 are estimated separately for 
large payoff differences (more than $0.50) and small payoff differences ($0.50).   
The difference in profit-maximizing choices between payoff difference groups is 
statistically significant (MW < 0.05): 63.8% with large payoff differences versus 51.4% 
with small payoff differences.  The results of the econometric estimations indicate that 
when the payoff differences are small, no treatment increases the likelihood to make 
optimal choices compared to hypothetical control, just like in the pooled model 3.  The 
engagement measured by the CRT, visual perusal measured by TVD, and participants’ age 
have any significant effects on the likelihood of making optimal choices (table 7).   
In contrast, when payoff differences are large, any number of alternatives with the 
potential for consequences increases the likelihood of participants making optimal choices.  
The parameter estimates for each treatment are statistically equivalent (p > 0.05), implying 
that all the treatments increase the likelihood of optimal choices equally.  Engagement is 
again significant, which implies that participants who are engaged regardless of the 
difference in payoffs make more profit-maximizing choices.  The numerical ability does 
not affect optimal decision making with large payoff differences.  The negative hourly 





Table 7.  Random-Effects Panel Logit Estimation for the Payoff Difference Levels 
  Model  
Variable Small difference Large Difference 
Partial availability – low -0.044 (0.192)  0.537*** (0.132) 
Partial availability – high 0.129 (0.270)  0.393*** (0.112) 
Full availability 0.077 (0.219)  0.557*** (0.148) 
     
Numeracy score     
1  0.278* (0.165) 0.250 (0.242) 
2  0.235 (0.284) 0.179 (0.175) 
3  0.309** (0.145) 0.430*** (0.161) 
4  0.059 (0.164) -0.186 (0.114) 
5  0.119 (0.121) 0.326** (0.147) 
     
CRT score     
1 0.338** (0.149) 0.304** (0.153) 
2 0.266 (0.188) 0.264 (0.225) 
3 0.396*** (0.092) 0.432*** (0.182) 
     
TVD 0.091 (0.069) 0.049 (0.088) 
Pupil dilation 0.054 (0.112) 0.173 (0.123) 
     
Demographics     
Age -0.018** (0.008) -0.012* (0.006) 
Female 0.097 (0.099) 0.243 (0.433) 
Hourly income -0.005 (0.005) -0.009** (0.003) 
College Education 0.518 (0.473) -0.312 (0.213) 
     
Constant -0.479 (1.047) -0.007 (0.713) 
     
N 917   655  
Log-likelihood -602.73  -399.95  
AIC 1241.46   835.90  
BIC 1328.24   916.49  
Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance at 10%, 5%, and 




Econometric analyses (tables 5 and 7) show that the numerical ability of 
participants has some effect on optimal choice-making by participants.  Meanwhile, 
significant parameter estimates for CRT throughout support the idea that engagement is 





The differences between the two approaches highlight the importance of participants’ 
engagement, captured by the CRT.   Overall, the results suggest that researchers using 
choice experiments for market valuation do not need to set up their studies such that all 
choices potentially have consequences to get incentive-compatible answers, as long as the 
differences in potential profits are large.  A study where only some alternatives may have 
consequences will work just as well as a study where all alternatives can have 
consequences as long as participants are engaged and/or motivated to exert the effort 
necessary by other means.  In contrast, participants in a study using ICE where all 
alternatives can have consequences may perform similar to a hypothetical choice 
experiment if they lack the engagement and/or desire to exert the effort. 
Conclusions 
Given the potential for biases when asking participants hypothetical questions, 
researchers have reacted by using incentivized choice experiments (ICE) for the valuation 
of public and private goods.  In ICE, one or more of the choices made by participants has 
consequences for the participant.  Much of the literature in choice experiments implies that 
incentivizing is an all-or-nothing choice – either all the choices used in the ICE have the 
potential for consequences or no choice is incentivized.  The results presented in this study 
suggest that this practice may not be necessary for participants to reveal their actual 
preferences under some circumstances.   
Comparing the hypothetical baseline to any of the incentivized treatments, where 
all or some of the alternatives may have consequences, results show, not surprisingly, that 
better performance is realized when incentives are present.  When estimating this effect 





better performance, while engagement measured with the cognitive reflection test (CRT) 
becomes an important explanatory variable of profit-maximizing behavior.  This result 
suggests that engagement provides a more accurate prediction of profit-maximizing 
behavior than the presence of incentives. 
The evaluation of how individual heterogeneity in terms of numerical ability and 
engagement impact profit-maximizing behavior provides some useful practical 
implications.  Using a numeracy scale to gauge numerical ability, it is discovered that 
numerical skills have a significant effect on performance, but this effect is far from 
monotonically increasing.  In terms of engagement, the results indicate that higher 
engagement leads to better performance.  This relationship between optimal choices and 
engagement is explored further by looking at the differences in payoffs.  To evaluate the 
effect of payoffs on engagement, the model is estimated separately for choices where the 
differences in payoffs are large versus small.  These estimations suggest that large payoff 
differences motivate participants to exert effort and engage in the task, resulting 
unequivocally in better performance, even when only a portion of the alternatives may 
have consequences.  This result highlights the importance of increasing the relevance of 
the task for participants, a topic that demands more research in the field.  When payoffs are 
large or participants are engaged by other means, any number of alternatives with the 
potential for consequences has a positive effect on the likelihood of making optimal 
choices.  
Different opportunities for future research stemming from this study come from the 
study’s limitations.  First, it could be argued that the sample used for the study is not 





A more meaningful limitation is the methodology used.  Future research could extend this 
by testing the methodology described here with actual private goods similar to Muller, 
Lacroix, and Ruffieux (2019).  The related literature cited does not tend to find the same 
biases in induced values framework as it does with actual goods.  There are several 
questions not addressed by this study that using actual private goods would help answer, 
such as the perceived availability of the products by participants.  Using real products with 
different number of available alternatives would inform researchers of market valuation for 
new product and product features.  Another limitation is the restricted number of factors 
affecting the performance of participants explored in this study.  Future research could 
consider more potential aspects of individual heterogeneity beyond numeracy, 
engagement, and demographics.  Some potential candidates include motivations, prosocial 
behavior, demand effects, and different dimensions of cognition.  Future research could 
also go deeper into the interactions between participants’ attributes.  The numeracy of 
participants, for example, is shown to affect performance.  More research into this 
particular result could shed some light on what the relationship with performance is and 
the process through which numeracy affects performance.   
Results also indicate that higher engagement leads to better performance regardless 
of the number of alternatives with the potential for consequences, a result that highlights 
the importance of how relevant the task is for participants.  How to increase engagement of 
participants and the relevance of the task would be a fruitful avenue for future research.  
Finally, the study’s bonus assignment may not be salient enough to incentivize respondents 
to choose the profit-maximizing choice.  This is a challenge to ICE in general that future 






ON THE USE OF NUDGES: HOW DEFAULT OPTIONS AND SELF-CONTROL 
AFFECT HONESTY 
 
A market is the intersection of sellers and buyers with the intent to cooperate and 
transact with each other.  In almost every market, if not all, one party possesses more 
information about the transaction than the other party does, violating one of the 
assumptions of perfect competition.  This situation where one party has more information 
than the other gives rise to a market with information asymmetry (Mishra, Heide, and Cort 
1998).  Markets where buyers withhold information that sellers do not possess (e.g. 
insurance, labor markets), or where sellers have information buyers do not possess (e.g. 
real estate, used cars) represent a large segment of modern economies.  Information 
asymmetry may lead to a positive outcome in some instances, such as the division of labor 
(Becker 1985).  Nevertheless, although asymmetric information is a natural outcome in 
markets (Leland and Pyle 1977), market asymmetry may result in inefficient markets.  
Akerlof (1970) shows information asymmetry can lead to a market ceasing to exist, 
reducing the welfare of society.   
Two aspects of information asymmetry that have been a focus of many studies are 
moral hazard and adverse selection (Hölmstrom 1979; Igawa and Kanatas 1990; Chiappori 
and Salanie 2000).  Moral hazard occurs when an agent possesses information that would 
benefit the other party, but the agent does not share or misrepresents the information 
(Pauly 1968).  This generally occurs when the agent believes there is a small probability of 





transact on the limited information available, and a suboptimal outcome is often reached 
(Arrow 1978).  Adverse selection occurs when the ability to withhold information 
encourages agents who benefit from the asymmetry to participate more actively in a 
market (Spence 1973).  The classic textbook example of adverse selection in the health 
insurance market.  In the insurance market, adverse selection occurs when people that have 
a larger probability than the average of using insurance (preexisting conditions, risky 
lifestyle, etc.) are the people who buy insurance (join the market) while concealing the 
truth about their activities to the insurance companies (second parties).  Adverse selection 
may lead to suboptimal outcomes, such as incorrect pricing of insurance (Hallagan 1978). 
Markets with products possessing credence attributes lend themselves to 
information asymmetry and potential subsequent problems.  Credence attributes are 
properties of goods and services that cannot be easily verified by buyers (Darby and Karni 
1973; Emons 1997).  The uncertainty around the truth of credence claims is large.  
Customers generally do not know how to identify these value-adding features until after 
the purchase (if at all), with vendors being the only ones who know the truth about these 
claims.  This is potentially problematic as there is a monetary incentive to deceive 
consumers for profit.  The price differential for organic products compared to the non-
organic counterpart, for example, ranges from 22% to 82% more for organic products 
(USDA-ERS 2019).  Meanwhile, there are claims of as much as 20% of products being 
mislabeled as organic, despite the regulations in place (Giannakas 2002).  The situation is 
even worse for other credence attribute labels such as “natural,” which unlike organic is 





In asymmetric markets, the trustworthiness of the exchange is determined by 
signals (Rothschild and Stiglitz 1978).  It is sensible to question whether the willingness to 
accept the word of the sellers about their signals as true – the trusting of buyers – and the 
willingness to reveal true information in the signals by sellers – honesty of the sellers – 
come to play in interpreting signals.  The trusting of buyers and honesty of sellers may be a 
serious problem given the growing popularity of credence attributes in markets and an 
increasing number of transactions happening in such settings.  Important research 
questions are: what conditions make sellers lie and what conditions make buyers more 
trusting?  In particular, the objective of this study is to find out how seemingly innocuous 
manipulations can affect honesty and trust in a market with asymmetric information.   
To answer these questions, the present study uses an experiment where participants 
are assigned roles of sellers and buyers in an artificial market with information asymmetry 
and explore what conditions increase (decrease) lying behavior by sellers and trusting 
behavior by buyers.  The focus of the study is on behavioral nudges that affect honesty and 
trust.  One manipulation varies the default action for sellers between a lie or the truth for 
sellers to evaluate if lying is different between treatments.  A second manipulation is self-
control depletion.  By exposing participants – buyers and sellers alike – to a self-control 
depletion task, changes in lying by sellers and trusting by buyers are measured.  Finally, 
the effect of the likelihood of being caught on honesty and trust is explored.  The morality, 
engagement, and numerical ability of participants are also measured, along with 
demographic controls to gauge the effect of such characteristics on participant behavior.  
Comparative statistics and econometric analyses are used to explain the effects of the 





Literature Review and Hypothesis Formulation 
Information Asymmetry in Markets 
Markets with information asymmetry are popular across the US.  Some food 
consumers, for example, base their produce purchases on the availability of products with 
credence attributes such as GMO-free, locally-grown, and organic (Feagan and Morris 
2009; Moser, Raffaelli, and Thilmany-McFadden 2011).  This preference for credence 
attributes is potentially problematic.  The accuracy of attribute claims is difficult and costly 
to verify by customers (Darby and Karni 1973).  Verification difficulty is especially true 
before a purchase is made.  Whether or not the products being sold possess the attributes 
declared is information only known by the sellers.  The buyers’ uncertainty about quality 
puts them at risk of being lied to (Bergen, Dutta, and Walker 1992).  Verification 
difficulties and uncertainty are the makings of a classic asymmetric market (Akerlof 1970).   
One type of lying that may arise in asymmetric markets is pricing low-quality items 
at high-quality prices.  Rao and Bergen (1992) argue that quality-conscious customers use 
price premiums as a way to guard themselves against sellers who would deliver lower 
quality than promised.  The way consumers use price to obtain accurate information on a 
product has a strong influence on a firm’s pricing decisions (Devinney 1988).  With 
information asymmetry, however, a moral hazard potentially exits.  Sellers charging price 
premiums for products are perceived as having higher quality even if the quality is not 
present.  Canonical pricing models predict the existence of such moral hazard (Varian 
1980; Tellis and Wernerfelt 1987).  These pricing models usually assume customers are 
not willing to exert the search costs to get accurate information on quality attributes and 





asymmetry are demanding more information, which has led to an increase in traceability, 
but this trend in traceability has not reached all markets (Hobbs 2004; Verbeke 2005).   
A deterrent to moral hazard is the loss of repeat purchases.  Liars are punished by 
loss of future sales.  This potential loss of future revenue promotes honest behavior in 
markets even in the absence of contractual obligations (Kreps 1990).  Some markets are 
operated by owners with little to no contractual obligation to buyers (Low et al. 2015).  
Furthermore, research has shown that in some markets buyers who discover they were lied 
to did not intend to stop buying from those venues (Gao, Swisher, and Zhao 2012).  In the 
absence of potential future revenue loss, there is a small deterrent to dishonest behavior 
(Grover and Goldberg 2010; Karp 2010).  This study explores if in artificial markets with 
information asymmetry and with no potential for loss of future revenue would sellers take 
advantage of their additional information to maximize profits.   
Lying: A Means to an End 
Research on honesty and lying by Gneezy (2005) highlights that participants in 
economic research studies will lie for self-gain even at the expense of other participants.  
Experiments conducted by Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013) find participants are 
dishonest when they have incentives and leeway to lie.  Participants in their study could lie 
to maximize their payoff.  Most participants chose to lie to obtain increased profits, but not 
to the largest level of potential profits.  A similar result is found in the field experiment in 
fish markets conducted by Dugar and Bhattacharya (2017). They find sellers lie but never 
more than 10% of the purchased quantity. 
An economic study about lying cannot focus only on the potential gain without 





(Bryant and Eckard 1991).  Saha and Poole (2000) show that penalties as a function of 
monitoring costs play a role in lying.  In asymmetric markets, the probability of being 
caught may be slim but non-zero.  It is an interesting empirical and theoretical question of 
whether a small, non-zero probability of being caught can influence dishonesty in 
asymmetric markets, giving rise to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: A non-zero probability of being caught decreases dishonest behavior in 
sellers with more information than buyers in asymmetric markets. 
Another interesting research stream that could be used to investigate dishonest 
behavior in asymmetric information markets is the use of behavioral nudges, in the spirit of 
Thaler and Sunstein (2008).  Nudges that modify behavior can take the form of default 
options, such that the default option can be opting in versus opting out (Johnson and 
Goldstein 2003).  Concerning honest behavior, it remains an unanswered question in the 
literature on markets with information asymmetry whether default options would make 
people more or less likely to lie.  If the default option is truthful, does that make people 
less likely to lie?  The literature on status quo biases (Samuelson and Zeckhauser 1988) 
suggests that this would be the case.  
Because of the bias that the default or status quo option invokes, changing the 
default option to be the truth may mitigate dishonest behavior.  An example of how 
participants in economic experiments can be dishonest when no status quo is promoted 
with the absence of a default option is found in Gneezy (2005).  Senders in a sender-
receiver game have to send a message about the distribution of a pool of money to the 
receivers and are allowed to lie to maximize their payoff.  Gneezy (2005) finds that 





supports the idea that people lie when no default option stops them from lying.  The 
contrast is when the default option leads to a status quo bias in favor of honesty, such as 
the work of Azar, Yosef, and Bar-Eli (2013).  Participants in their study receive more 
change than they should when paying cash at a restaurant.  Participants are dishonest if 
they keep the extra cash (assuming they pay attention), which would be the default option.  
Azar, Yosef, and Bar-Eli (2013) find that participants are likely to return the extra cash if 
the change amount is large but otherwise participants keep it.  This result shows that the 
status quo bias that the default option invokes could potentially be influential on honesty 
behavior in markets with information asymmetry.   
The literature on moral licensing would suggest that at the very least there would 
be an increase in lying with the default option being a lie (Blanken, van de Ven, and 
Zeelenberg 2015).  When the setup of a choice is such that a decision-maker can excuse 
their immoral or deceitful behavior by making it acceptable to do a bad deed, individuals 
are more likely to engage in such behavior (Merritt, Effron, and Monin 2010).  The 
capacity of a default option working as a nudge and affecting dishonesty through a status 
quo bias is formalized in the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: Having the default option being the truth increases the honest behavior of 
sellers. 
A broad definition of self-control is the capacity to alter one’s behavior 
(Baumeister and Vohs 2007).  The ability to exert self-control is crucial in daily life.  
Society depends on individuals exerting self-control to function adequately.  Self-control, 
interestingly, can be considered as a depletable resource (Muraven and Baumeister 2000) 





depleted self-control that are costly to society include large debt (Gathergood and Weber 
2014), overspending (Shah, Mullainathan, and Shafir 2012), reduced productivity 
(Bucciol, Houser, and Piovesan 2011), and dishonesty (Baumeister and Vohs 2007).  
Being honest is an action that requires self-control that has been studied in economics 
because of the large social costs of dishonesty (Sutter 2009; Wang, Rao, and Houser 2017).  
From a utility standpoint, being dishonest may be a rational act when there are no 
consequences to lying (Hao and Houser 2017).  Rational action – the expectation of 
economic theory – is that people will lie as long as they have incentives to do so and there 
is a small likelihood of being caught (Conrads et al. 2013; Chen and Houser 2017).  
Honesty requires effort and as a consequence when self-control is depleted lying is more 
prevalent than when self-control has not been reduced (Mead et al. 2009).  The moderating 
effect of self-control on honesty is illustrated by Mazar, Amir, and Ariely (2008) who 
show that attention is impaired when self-control has been depleted.  If there is a lack or 
reduction of self-control, attention to social norms may be reduced, reducing honesty.  The 
issues that self-control depletion could bring to a market with information asymmetry are 
stated in the next hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 3a: Self-control depletion in sellers increases their dishonesty. 
Hypothesis 3b: Self-control depletion in buyers decreases their trust. 
Individual Factors Affecting Honesty 
Efficient economic exchanges require agents to be able to correctly identify their 
respective payoffs to maximize their utilities and assign values to the information in the 
market (Hirshleifer 1971).  The cognitive ability of participants, therefore, is one trait that 





al. 2012; Agarwal and Mazumder 2013).  One area of cognitive ability that would affect 
decision making in asymmetric markets is numeracy (Kløjgaard, Bech, and Søgaard 2012).  
Numeracy, defined as “…the ability to process basic probability and numerical concepts.” 
(Peters et al. 2006, p. 407), enables sellers to make the connections between their actions – 
honest or dishonest – and their payoffs.  Numeracy (or lack thereof) makes buyers mindful 
about the transaction and less trusting of the sellers’ claims.  The way numeracy could 
influence the interactions in a market with information asymmetry is formalized in the 
following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 4a: Increased numerical ability decreases the honesty of sellers. 
Hypothesis 4b: Increased numerical ability decreases the trust of buyers. 
Honest behavior can be the result of a social norm (Lindbeck 1997; Fehr and Falk 
2002; Pruckner and Sausgruber 2013).  To follow social norms, engagement with moral 
standards and how they relate to the task at hand is necessary.  If the engagement of sellers 
is compromised, compliance with the social norm is less likely (Brekke, Kverndokk, and 
Nyborg 2003; Rege and Telle 2004).  Besides, buyers who are engaged are less likely to be 
deceived, while less engaged buyers are more likely to be deceived (Pittarello et al. 2016).  
The influence on market exchanges with asymmetric information of engagement is 
formalized with the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 5a: Increased engagement of sellers increases their honesty. 
Hypothesis 5b: Increased engagement in buyers reduces their trust. 
Morality 
Lying is at its essence an ethical issue (Williams 2012).  Individuals and firms who 





they lie (Ogilby 1995; Hoffman, McCabe, and Smith 1996; Bohnet and Frey 1999), in a 
similar manner to buyers’ traits influencing their level of trust (Doney and Cannon 1997; 
Doney, Cannon, and Mullen 1998; Sirdeshmukh, Singh, and Sabol 2002).  Dishonest 
behavior and trusting in the honesty of others are dependent on the morality of individuals 
(Haidt 2008).  A higher degree of morality serves as a deterrent to lying and encourages 
trust.  The way these actions would influence behavior in asymmetric markets is 
formalized as: 
Hypothesis 6a: A higher degree of morality in sellers increases their honesty. 
Hypothesis 6b: A higher degree of morality in buyers increases their trusting. 
Methodology 
This study uses a seller / buyer game conducted between participants in a 2 x 2 x 2 
design with a nudge for honesty (default lie vs. default truth), a self-control depletion (no 
depletion vs. depletion task), and the probability of being caught (0% vs 10%) as factors. 
Seller-Buyer Game 
The seller / buyer game is a modified version of Gneezy’s (2005) sender / receiver 
game with two different payout options.  The study is conducted on computers using a 
web-application developed with the Python programming language in the Otree platform 
(Chen, Schonger, and Wickens 2016).  All public information is on the computer screens 
throughout the experiment as a reference for the participants.  The game is set up as a 
single-shot game to exclude the possibility of repeated purchases and to avoid strategic 
behavior by participants.  To guarantee anonymity, participants are assigned identification 
numbers uncorrelated to their personally identifiable information.  Since the objective of 





roles assigned to participants are named buyer and seller to prime participants with the 
notion that they are participating in a market.  Using the terms sender and receiver would 
have not been as helpful in priming participants.   
Before the game begins, participants are randomly assigned the role of seller or 
buyers and are then paired randomly to play their assigned roles of seller and buyer.  
Participants are informed that a monetary payment of $5 will be distributed between the 
members of each pair.  Instructions to the participants explain there are two ways the $5 
prize will be distributed, Options A and B.  
At this point, it is made clear to all participants that the buyers will choose between 
the two options and that the buyer’s decision is used for the distribution of the payment to 
the participants.  To generate information asymmetry in this market sellers have 
information that buyers do not.  Buyers do not know the distribution of the prize but obtain 
information from the sellers about the distribution.  Only sellers are disclosed how Options 
A and B distribute the $5 prize.  Sellers are provided the information that Option A pays 
$2 to the seller and $3 to the buyer, whereas option B payments are $3 for the seller and $2 
for the buyer.  Sellers are required to send a message to influence the buyer’s choice – a 
one-line sales pitch so to speak.  The payout distributions remain on the seller’s computer 
screen while they decide on what message to send to the buyers.  The message options that 
the seller can send are displayed in a box (Figure 4). 
 






Figure 4. Message sending box viewed by the sellers. 
 
 
Default Option: Lie or Truth 
The first factor explored in this study is the effect of the status quo brought by the 
default option.  The intent is to evaluate if there is any effect on honest behavior when the 
default is honesty.  This treatment varies the effort to express honesty in a very subtle way: 
changing the default message sellers can choose to send.  For the honesty default 
manipulation, the radio button is defaulted to message 1 – Option A pays you (the buyer) 












Sellers have to change the radio button to message 2 – Option B pays you more – if 
they want to be dishonest.  In the dishonesty status quo manipulation, the radio button 
defaults at message 2, the lie.  Sellers have to change the radio button to message 1, to be 
honest.  In either manipulation, the seller must click on the “next” button to send the 
message to the buyer.  Participants have to exert effort, albeit very small, either to lie or to 
be truthful in either condition.  To maximize their payment, sellers have the incentive to 
send message 2.  This manipulation allows for the identification of differences in honest 
behavior by default option by comparing how often message 1 is sent.   
While sellers are making their choice of message to send, buyers are watching a 
waiting screen with a timer.  Once the seller has sent the message, buyers see a box (Figure 
5) that tells them the recommendation of the seller and asks them which option they would 
like to choose for the distribution of the cash payout.  Once buyers make the distribution 
option selection, a screen with open-ended questions that are discussed later is presented to 






Self-Control Depletion Task 
The second factor evaluated is the effect of self-control depletion.  It has been 
documented that participants lie for self-gain when self-control is depleted (Mead et al. 
2009).  The two questions explored in this study on this regard are whether there is an 
effect of self-control depletion on lying by the sellers and if self-control depletion affects 
the likelihood of buyers to follow sellers’ advice, none of which have been explored in the 
literature. 
To deplete self-control resources, a task similar to the one developed by Houser et 
al. (2018) is presented to half of the participants.  Before the seller / buyer game, 
participants (both buyers and sellers) in the self-control depletion manipulation are shown 
30 series of nine digits (ones and zeroes) and are asked to count the number of times the 
number one appears in the series and enter the number in the space provided on the screen 
(Figure 6).  Between the number series screens, participants were presented with a waiting 
screen, showing the time elapsed since the start of the experiment.  Research has shown 
that a prior activity varies the response to a new activity and the engagement with a task 
over time (Yoon et al. 2006).  To account for this effect the stimuli (number series) and the 
waiting screens were presented for different amounts of time, following the common 
practice in behavioral research (Lin et al. 2018).  Each different series of numbers is 
displayed for either 10 or 15 seconds randomly.  The waiting screens are presented for 






Figure 6. Number counting (a) and waiting (b) screens viewed by participants in the self-




In total, participants in this manipulation are presented with 30 counting screens 
and 29 waiting screens.  Participants exposed to the self-control depletion manipulation 
perform the self-control task for a total of approximately 15 minutes (30 counting screens 
for 10-15 seconds and 29 waiting screens for 15-20 seconds equals 880 seconds ~ 15 
minutes).  The other half of the participants are the control group and are not exposed to 
any counting task.  To avoid a fatigue effect, the control group views a 15-minute video on 
“The History of Formula 1” before the seller / buyer game.  Similar neutral manipulations 
have been used in the cognitive load literature (Marcora, Staiano, and Manning 2009).  
This activity is also included to help avoid the income effect of the payment distribution.  










complete the study, the payment per time spent in the study would be higher.  There is a 
chance this could lead to an income effect on the results. 
If self-control affects being truthful, sellers exposed to the self-control depletion 
task should be more likely to send the deceptive message to buyers relative to the control.  
Comparing differences in lying between self-control depletion manipulations will shed 
light on how self-control depletion impacts honesty.  If self-control depletion makes 
participants more trusting, more buyers follow the suggestion of the seller under the self-
control depletion manipulation.  To gauge trusting of buyers, an analysis of the proportion 
of buyers that followed the advice of sellers, e.g. seller sent message 1 and buyer chose 
Option A and vice-versa, is done in each of the self-control depletion manipulations.   
Probability of Being Caught 
When the cost of being caught lying exceeds the potential benefits of lying, honesty 
is expected (Kajackaite and Gneezy 2017).  Most markets operating under information 
asymmetry have a non-zero probability of being caught lying (Kübler, Müller, and 
Normann 2008).  Authors across different fields document how decreasing (increasing) of 
the probability of being caught lying fosters (mitigates) dishonest behavior (Saha and 
Poole 2000; Treisman 2000; Wikström, Tseloni, and Karlis 2011).   
To investigate the effect of the probability of being caught lying on truthful 
behavior, half of the participants, the control group, play the game under complete 
information asymmetry – sellers have 0% probability of being caught if they lie.  For the 
other half of the participants, sellers have a chance of being caught if they lie.  The purpose 
of having sellers face a likelihood of being caught has less to do with the actual probability 





get caught if they do.  It has been documented that a large probability of being caught 
would deter lying (Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi 2013).  This study, however, explores if 
a small probability of being caught lying that may be perceived as inconsequential to some 
of the sellers interacts with the effect of the default option and self-control depletion on 
truth-telling.  This follows from the idea that agents in markets with information 
asymmetries have relatively small probabilities of being caught. 
To help determine what probability of being caught could potentially prompt a 
different course of action by sellers, the literature on the likelihood of being caught in 
different markets is examined.  Bryant and Eckard (1991) find 13-17% is the likelihood 
that a firm in the United States may be caught price-fixing in any given year by regulatory 
agencies.  Combe, Monnier, and Legal (2008) show that in Europe the probability of being 
caught as a part of a cartel is 12-13%.  Scholz and Pinney (1995) found that though the 
probability of being audited by the IRS is 1%, the likelihood of being caught in tax evasion 
is much smaller (<1% of the audited sample).  In food markets, it is even more challenging 
to gauge the real size of the problem, as most of the fraud goes undetected, and when fraud 
occurs the fear of retaliation leads to underreporting (Wiseman 2013).  This is also related 
to the lack of attention that has been given to crimes on food by researchers and regulatory 
agencies (Lord, Flores Elizondo, and Spencer 2017).  The work of Shears (2010) sheds 
some light by finding that fish markets in the UK sell salmon with either altered or no 
information on average 15% of the time, but the probability that vendors get caught is less 
than 2%.  Experimental research on lying has used different probabilities of being caught 
ranging from 3% (Gamliel and Peer 2013) to 80% (Coricelli et al. 2010; Pascual-Ezama et 










Given the vast dispersion of probabilities that have been used in similar contexts 
and the large range of probabilities documented in markets, there is no clear guidance as to 
what constitutes an appropriate probability of being caught that could influence behavior in 
of participants this context.  Therefore, as a probability that could be relevant for some 






caught lying in the game.  A rationale for the use of 10% is that this percentage may be 
easier to understand than other probabilities due to its fluency (Coulter and Roggeveen 
2014) –  using 10% may help eliminate the potential confusion among participants by 
having trouble processing the probabilities (Peters et al. 2006). 
To include the probability of being caught, for 1 of 10 pairs of participants in the 
disclosure manipulation both participants are given the payout distribution information.  
Sellers are made aware of the possibility of payout distributions being disclosed to buyers 
in the instructions before they choose which message to send to buyers (Figure 7).  This 
allows sellers to decide if they would prefer to risk lying or not before sending the 
message. 
No penalty comes to the sellers from this disclosure, but the setup allows sellers to 
be aware that their true intent may be revealed to the buyers.  This is important in the 
design, as with no monetary consequence, the possibility of being caught lying affects only 
the intrinsic motivations of sellers, as the other manipulations do.  Also, by not imposing a 
penalty on sellers the potential effects of different risk aversion over gains and losses are 
avoided.  The probability of getting caught is enacted by showing the distributions of 
payments to buyers in 1 of 10 pairs in the disclosure condition.  Those buyers who are 
shown the payout information see below the payment distribution information the message 
sent by the seller about which option the buyer should pick (Figure 8).  Disclosing the 
payout distribution information will reveal to the buyer if the seller was being truthful or 
not in their message.  A comparison of truthful messages sent informs on the effect of the 













After participants complete the self-control depletion task (or distraction), they 
proceed to play the seller / buyer game.  After participants play their roles of seller and 
buyer in the game but before their respective payouts are revealed, participants are asked 
open-ended questions about their motives (Figure 9).  Sellers are asked why they sent the 
message they sent and what their expectations from the buyers are.  Buyers are asked why 
they chose the distribution they did and what are their beliefs about the seller.  Once the 





















Probability of  
being caught 
Number of  
Participants 
1 Truth No No 45 
2 Truth Yes No 63 
3 Truth No Yes 48 
4 Truth Yes Yes 48 
5 Lie No No 51 
6 Lie Yes No 42 
7 Lie No Yes 39 




Participants also complete a scale that measures their numerical ability (Weller et 
al. 2013) and the cognitive reflection test (Frederick 2005) to capture their engagement 
level.  The morality of participants is measured using the scale developed by Aquino and 
Reed (2002).  A copy of the complete survey instrument is available in Appendix E.  When 
finished, participants are paid according to the distribution chosen by the buyer and 
dismissed.  The information about the prize being distributed is present on every screen the 
participants see.  No other information beyond the information previously described is 
available to participants.  A summary of the different treatments is presented in table 8. 
Econometric Specification 
The main outcome of this study is whether or not sellers lie.  This is a binary 
choice.  The decisions of sellers are identified as either 1 if the message sent is a lie and 
coded as 0 if the message sent is the truth denoted by the variable lie.  The behavior of 
buyers is evaluated similarly.  Whenever the buyer chooses the option recommended by 
the seller, the variable trust is coded as a 1.  Meanwhile, a 0 in the trust indicates the buyer 





Given the outcomes are binary, the probabilities of the events can be modeled with 
different approaches.  The two most common distributional assumptions made to model 
binary outcomes are the probit and logit models.  These models assume that the data either 
come from an inverse normal distribution (probit) or a logistic distribution (logit) 
(Wooldridge 2010).  The difference in the assumed probability distributions implies that a 
logit relative to a probit will be better at capturing extreme values (Greene 2012).  This 
makes the estimation slightly more robust3.   
Given these properties, a logit model with robust standard errors is used to evaluate 
the choices of sellers and buyers in this study.  The model selection implies that the 
estimation being fit is calculating the probability of lying or trusting (y) with the following 
specification: 𝑃𝑃(𝑦𝑦 = 1|𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛) =
exp(𝛽𝛽 𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛)
1+exp(𝛽𝛽𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛)
, where 𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛 is the vector of individual 
characteristics and manipulations that are used to predict the choice.  To measure the 
effects of the manipulations on lying and trusting, each treatment manipulation is modeled 
as a 0 /1 qualitative variable with 0 being the control group and 1 indicating participants 
were exposed to the manipulation.  Numeracy, cognitive reflection, morality, and age in 
years are included as continuous variables.  Gender is a qualitative variable with being 
male coded as 1 and 0 otherwise.  Participants’ race is accounted for in the model with 0 / 
1 qualitative variables for white, Asian, and other races. The last variable includes 
participants who identified as Black, Latino, Native American, or mixed-race.  These are 
not a separate category since participants that identify as such comprise 7% of the sample. 
 






Table 9: Summary of Individual Characteristics in the Sample  
 Treatment  
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 All 
Average age 20.07 20.38 20.63 19.94 20.29 19.79 21.38 20.26 20.33 
 
 (0.19) (0.15) (0.21) (0.26) (0.17) (0.13) (0.46) (0.18) (0.08) 
Males (%) 46.67 19.05 25.00 50.00 47.06 50.00 46.15 31.58 37.88 
 
 (0.07) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.06) (0.02) 
White (%) 60.00 71.43 81.25 87.50 58.82 64.29 69.23 70.00 70.45 
 
 (7.36) (5.74) (5.69) (4.82) (6.96) (7.48) (5.85) (5.97) (2.30) 
Asian (%) 13.33 19.05 12.50 0.00 23.53 35.71 15.38 30.00 18.00 
 
 (5.12) (4.99) (4.82) (0.00) (6.00) (7.48) (5.85) (5.97) (1.97) 
Othera (%) 26.67 9.52 6.25 12.5 23.54 14.29 15.38 0.00 12.88 
 
 (6.67) (3.73) (3.53) (4.82) (6.00) (5.46) (5.85) (0.00) (1.69) 
Numeracy score (max 5) 3.93 3.48 3.63 4.06 3.29 4.14 3.54 3.68 3.68 
 
 (0.15) (0.18) (0.17) (0.11) (0.18) (0.14) (0.23) (0.14) (0.06) 
CRT score (max 3) 0.60 0.71 0.44 0.88 0.82 1.07 0.38 1.00 0.75 
 
 (0.14) (0.12) (0.13) (0.17) (0.14) (0.17) (0.10) (0.14) (0.05) 
Morality (max 7) 4.57 4.69 4.94 4.48 4.45 4.60 4.63 4.47 4.60 
 
 (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.12) (0.12) (0.09) (0.08) (0.03) 
Participants 45 63 48 48 51 42 39 57 393 
a The other races declared by participants were Black, Latino, Native American, and mixed race. None 






Four hundred participants took part in the experiment.  One seller did not follow 
the instructions and the data from this seller and buyer are removed.  Two other buyers did 
not complete the survey portion of the study and are excluded from the analysis.  These 





Table 10: Correlations Between the Variables Used in the Estimations 
Variable  Age Male White Asian Other Numeracy Score 
CRT 
Score Morality 
Age   1.00        
Male   0.17*  1.00       
White  -0.22* -0.11  1.00      
Asian  -0.16 -0.02 -0.70* 1.00     
Other  -0.12  0.12 -0.54* -0.07  1.00    
Numeracy score  -0.15   0.18  0.14  0.03 -0.22  1.00   
CRT score   0.06  0.32 -0.11  0.16  0.05  0.44*  1.00  
Morality   0.00 -0.10  0.05 -0.03 -0.11 -0.11 -0.19* 1.00 




The study was conducted in 16 different sessions (two sessions per treatment) in 
the Behavioral Research Lab at the Gatton College of Business and Economics at the 
University of Kentucky.  The assignment of treatments was random but was done by 
session and not to the experiment as a whole.  Participants were undergraduate students 
enrolled in business courses at the University of Kentucky.  Participants taking part in the 
experiment received extra credit in one of their courses in the Business School.  Each 
participant only plays the game once in the role of a seller or a buyer.   
A summary of the demographic variables and scale values by treatment is given in 
table 9.  As expected from using a college student sample, the students’ age, numerical 
ability, cognitive reflection, and morality are relatively homogenous.  The gender and race 
proportions are not distributed equally between treatment manipulations (𝜒𝜒2 p < 0.05).  
This could jeopardize the validity of the results.  To evaluate how worrisome gender and 
race distributions may be, correlations between the variables are informative (table 10).  





(numeracy, CRT, and morality) are not correlated in a statistically significant way with the 
demographics.  Therefore, though not ideal, it is unlikely that the unbalanced sample has a 
significant effect on the results, and race and gender are included in the econometric 
analysis4. 
Results 
Effects of Information Asymmetry on Behavior 
This study set out to test if the different manipulations affect lying behavior in an 
artificial market with information asymmetry.  Treatment effects are tested by evaluating 
the percentage of sellers who lied in each of the experimental conditions.  A summary of 
the average percentage of lying by sellers is shown in table 11.  The proportion of sellers 
who lied is statistically different from zero in all conditions.  The main inference drawn 
from these results is that, not surprisingly, sellers who possess more information than 
buyers use the information to make additional profits.  
The percentage of sellers lying is 54.3% when there was a chance of being caught 
compared to 52.9% when there was not a chance of being caught.  These percentages are 
not significantly different (𝜒𝜒2=.01, p > 0.10); therefore, the results do not support 
hypothesis 1.  Different default options produce statistically different levels of truth-telling. 
Sixty percent of sellers send the truthful message when the default is the truth condition 
compared to 40.0% when the default is a lie condition (𝜒𝜒2 = 4.10, p < 0.10), providing 
support for hypothesis 2. 
 
4 The models are estimated excluding the unbalanced demographics and have the same pattern and 





Table 11: Summary of Choices by Sellers in Each Treatment  
Chance of getting caught  Can get caught  Cannot get caught  Average 
Self-control  Depleted Not depleted  Depleted Not depleted   
Default option  Truth Lie Truth Lie  Truth Lie Truth Lie   
Lying (%)  37.50 68.97 47.83 65.38  53.13 57.14 58.33 40.00  54.27 
  (10.09) (8.74) (10.65) (9.51) (8.96) (11.07) (10.28) (11.24)  (3.54) 
N  24 29 23 26  32 21 24 20  199 




The depletion of self-control increases lying behavior in sellers. This provides 
support  for hypothesis 3a, with 62.0% of sellers lying in the self-control depletion group 
versus 38.0% in the control group (𝜒𝜒2 = 6.58, p < 0.10). 
Effects of Treatments and Individual Traits on Behavior 
To examine the effects of the different manipulations simultaneously, the purpose 
of designing a full factorial study, the choices of lying and trusting are modeled as a logit 
model in Stata (StataCorp 2015) using the logit command (table 12).  As discussed 
previously, the estimation includes qualitative (0/1) variables for the treatments (BC, 
where 1 is having a 10% chance of being caught lying, DT with 1 implying the default 
option, is the truth and SC where 1 means that self-control is available and not depleted), 
the interactions between the treatments, age, gender, race (other race as the base), and 
numeracy and engagement (measured with CRT) as individual traits.  Correlations 
between the variables suggest multicolinearity is not a problem in the data5 (table 10). 
 
 
5 A variance inflation factor (VIF) analysis was also done on the data and the mean VIF is 1.50, and the 





Table 12: Logit Estimation of the Likelihood of Lying by Sellers and Trusting by 
Buyers 
Variable 
Lying  Trusting 
Coefficient Std error  Coefficient Std error 
Being caught (BC) 1.041 (0.758)    
Default truth (DT) -0.545 (0.582)    
Self-control (SC) 0.006 (0.799)  -1.453*** (0.370) 
BC x DT -2.274** (1.034)    
SC x DT -1.016 (0.984)    
SC x BC -2.974*** (1.128)    
BC x DT x SC 4.856*** (1.128)    
      
Numeracy score 0.212 (0.190)  0.049 (0.183) 
CRT score -1.111*** (0.256)  -0.365* (0.206) 
Morality 0.455** (0.232)  0.211 (0.295) 
Demographics      
Age 0.008* (0.117)   -0.071 (0.110) 
Male 0.612 (0.399)   -0.076 (0.397) 
White -0.684 (0.561)   0.466 (0.532) 
Asian -1.357* (0.702)   -1.437** (0.637) 
Intercept -0.839 (2.878)  2.516 (3.065) 
      
N 199    189  
Log-likelihood -114.96   -100.11  
AIC 259.93   218.21  
BIC 309.33   247.81  
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% is denoted by *, 




The econometric estimation yields somewhat different results than the comparative 
statistics tests.  With an experimental design like the one used in this study, the treatment 





First, the three-way interaction between self-control being available, having a 
likelihood of getting caught, and the default option being the truth is positive and 
statistically significant (p < 0.10; table 12). A significant three-way interaction implies that 
the interaction of two of the factors has different effects on the different levels of the third 
factor.  Interactions at the different levels of a third factor are better understood by 
examining them graphically.   
Predicted probabilities of lying based on the logit model are graphed in figure 10.  
The predicted probabilities are estimated using the margins command in Stata (StataCorp 
2015).  The probability of lying is estimated using the parameter estimates from the 
estimated logit model and calculating the probabilities at the mean value of the covariates 
for each of the different combinations of treatments.  The predicted probabilities for lying 
when self-control has been depleted are given by the bars at the top of figure 10, whereas 
the bottom bars gives the predicted probabilities when self-control is available.  To assess 
the three-way interaction, the interaction between the two factors, the default option and 
the probability of being caught lying are evaluated under the two levels of the third factor, 
self-control being depleted and self-control being available.  
In the top bars, it is illustrated that when self-control is depleted having a 10% 
chance of being caught works together with having a default truth option to reduce lying 
behavior.  When self-control is depleted and there is a 10% chance of being caught, sellers 
lie 86% in the default lie condition versus 29% when the default is the truth (𝑧𝑧 = 3.73, p < 
0.10).  With self-control depleted and no chance of being caught lying, sellers lie 
statistically the same amount under both default options, with 69% when the default is a lie 






Figure 10: Lying probability by the sellers in different conditions when self-control is 




Therefore, when self-control is depleted having both a chance of being caught lying 
and a default truth reduces lying behavior, but just one of these manipulations does not 
reduce lying in a statistically significant way.  When self-control is available the previous 
results on the interaction between the chance of being caught and the default option does 





chance of being caught lying, the probability of lying is statistically the same, 49% 
probability of lying when the default is the truth versus 26% when the default is a lie (𝑧𝑧 = 
1.31, p > 0.10).  Meanwhile, when there is no chance of being caught lying, sellers lie 34% 
of the time when the default is the truth and 69% when the default is a lie (𝑧𝑧 = 2.01, p < 
0.10).  These results indicate that when self-control is available the interaction between the 
10% chance of being caught lying and the default option being the truth is lessened.  There 
is less lying between a default truth and a default lie when the probability of being caught 
lying is zero.  The three-way interaction, therefore, implies that the default option being the 
truth interacts positively with a 10% chance of being caught lying when self-control is 
depleted, but that when self-control is available, the default option being the truth does not 
interact with the chance of being caught (p < 0.10). 
The next step is to address the two-way interactions.  The interaction between the 
chance of being caught lying and having the default option be the truth is negative and 
statistically significant (p < 0.10; table 12).  The interpretation is that if the default option 
is the truth and there is a chance of being caught lying, sellers are less likely to lie.  In other 
words, these two conditions work together to reduce the chance of lying by sellers.  The 
probability of lying is statistically the same when the default is a lie (68%) and a default 
being the truth (48%) when there is no chance of being caught lying (p > 0.10), but 
statistically lower for the default truth (37%) versus the default lie (63%) when there is a 
10% chance of being caught lying (p < 0.10). 
The second two-way interaction is between self-control availability and the 
probability of being caught lying, which is also negative and statistically significant (p < 





depleted, they care more about being caught lying, which reduces their incentives to lie.  
When self-control is available the probability of being caught reduces dishonesty (p < 
0.10).  Comparing the marginal probabilities of lying when self-control is depleted versus 
when self-control is available illustrates this interaction.  For example, when there is a 10% 
chance of being caught lying and self-control is available the probability of lying is 39%, 
which is statistically lower than the 54% probability of lying found when self-control has 
been depleted, (p < 0.10). 
Finally, the interaction between having self-control available and the default option 
being the truth is not statistically different from zero (p > 0.10; table 12).  This interaction 
implies that having the option being the truth does not make sellers who have self-control 
available lie less, nor does having the default option being a lie make sellers with self-
control depleted lie more.  The probability of lying with a default truth when self-control is 
available (41%) is statistically equivalent to the probability of lying when self-control is 
depleted (44%; p > 0.10). 
The parameter estimates for the main effects of the treatments are not statistically 
significant (p > 0.10; table 12).  Given that the interactions between the treatments are 
significant, it is not surprising that the main effects of the treatments are not statistically 
different from zero.  Having significant interactions between the treatments implies that the 
effects of the treatments are conditional on the levels of the other factors.  Therefore, the 
influence of each treatment on reducing lying is captured by the conditional effect that the 
interactions with the other treatments reflect.  The marginal effects for each treatment, 
however, provide support for the hypotheses 1, 2, and 3a, corroborating the findings of the 





probability of sellers lying at 57% versus 47% with no chance of being caught (z = 1.93, p 
< 0.10).  Having the default option being the truth will likely reduce lying (64% lying with 
a default lie versus 44% lying with a default truth; z = 2.93, p < 0.10).  The last treatment, 
self-control depletion, makes sellers more likely to lie (59% with self-control depleted vs. 
43% with self-control available; z = 2.63, p < 0.10).  These main effects are then modified 
by interactions between the treatments but provide some guidance for future experiments 
that hope to reduce lying. 
The estimation results (table 12) indicate there is no statistically significant 
relationship between numerical ability and lying behavior, therefore not supporting 
hypothesis 4a.  The parameter estimate for CRT is negative and statistically significant. 
implying as the engagement of sellers increases lying is less likely, supporting hypothesis 
5a.  Estimation results show an opposite direction to that suggested in hypothesis 6a; larger 
scores in the morality scale increases the likelihood of lying by sellers.  As for the 
demographic controls, lying is marginally reduced by age, and sellers who self-identified 
as Asian are less likely to lie. 
To evaluate the trusting behavior of buyers it is important to understand how the 
manipulations play a role for buyers.  Buyers can trust or mistrust the information received 
from the sellers if they do not possess the payout information.  Recall that in sessions 
under the getting caught lying treatment, one out of ten buyers was randomly selected to 
have the payout information disclosed to them.  Therefore, in sessions when treatments 3, 
4, 7, and 8 were conducted there were buyers to whom the payout information was 
revealed.  These buyers, unlike the rest of the buyers in the study, do not experience 





Table 13: Summary of Choices by Buyers in Each Treatment 
 Self-control depletion  No Self-control depletion  Average 





N 72  117  189 




These buyers, therefore, cannot choose between trusting or mistrusting the sellers, 
as they make their choices of payout distribution with full information regardless of the 
messages sent by their sellers.  Therefore, although buyers and sellers were paired in the 
study, there are fewer buyers to analyze the effects of the treatments than there are sellers 
because some buyers having full information. Eight buyers are in the getting caught 
treatment manipulation and were randomly selected to have the payout information 
disclosed to them.  The choices from these buyers with full information provide an idea of 
the default behavior of buyers who have full information.  The remaining 189 buyer data 
points are used to estimate the treatment effects.   
By design, the only treatment manipulation that the buyers are exposed to is the 
self-control depletion.  The default option in the messages to be sent is not information that 
the buyers are given.  The probability of being caught lying displayed to the sellers is also 
information that the buyers do not see.  Therefore, there is no reason to expect that the 
default option and the possibility of being caught have any impact on the decisions of 
buyers.  The eight buyers who faced full information can provide support to the 
assumption that the probability of sellers being caught and the default option for sellers did 
not change buyers’ behavior.  The eight buyers followed the sellers’ advice in a similar 





= 0.17, p > 0.10).  Furthermore, from the four buyers who were in the default truth and the 
four buyers who were in the default lie conditions half of each group chose the payout 
distribution that was recommended by the sellers.  These results imply that the buyers 
behave similarly whether they are in the groups where sellers have a probability of being 
caught lying, or whether there are in a group where sellers have a default truth.  With these 
results in mind, the trust demonstrated by the rest of the buyers is evaluated only by self-
control depletion (table 13) finding that when self-control is depleted buyers trust more. 
The Effects of Morality and the Qualitative Analysis of the Open-ended Responses 
The estimation of the model showed that higher moral value scores did not affect 
the trusting behavior of buyers, but a higher score in morality increases the likelihood of 
lying by sellers.  This last result is surprising and counterintuitive as the logic would 
suggest highly moral sellers would lie less.  Potential explanations are found in the review 
of the comments expressed in the open-ended section of the study.  Comments provided by 
the sellers about their motivations to send the message they sent and the buyers to accept 
or reject the offers from the sellers are evaluated using qualitative sentiment analysis (Pang 
and Lee 2008).  With this analysis, the motivations of sellers and buyers are grouped into 
five categories (table 14). 
The categories for the motivations of the sellers are profit-maximizing, honesty 
perceptions, strategic behavior, regards for others, and self-justification.  The motivation 
categories for the buyers to accept or reject the offers are profit-maximization, honesty 
perceptions, strategic behavior, the expectation of negative reciprocity, and the nature of 





Table 14: Summary of the Stated Motivations of Sellers for the Message Sent 
 Seller Behavior   Buyer Behavior 
Motivation Dishonest Honest  Motivation Trust Mistrust 
Profit maximizing 82%   Profit maximizing 5%  
       
Self-justification 13%   Honesty perceptions 87% 58% 
       
Honesty perceptions  56%  Strategic behavior  17% 
       
Strategic behavior 5% 28%  Negative reciprocity  25% 
       




Buyers who accepted the offers from sellers mentioned they expected sellers to be 
honest as the main source of their desire to trust the information (87%), with the nature of 
the information (8%), and their desire to maximize profits (5%) as alternate explanations.  
Buyers who mistrusted the messages from sellers expressed their concern about the 
honesty of the sellers as the main motivation to not trust the seller (58%), with their 
expectations about reciprocity (25%) and strategic behavior by the sellers (17%) as 
alternate justifications. The motives expressed by truthful sellers indicated honesty 
perceptions as the main driver of their choice (56%), with strategic behavior (28%), and 
regards for others (16%) as second and third rationales.  In contrast, the main reason cited 
by sellers who lied is profit-maximizing (82%).  The other two motives used by sellers 
who lied are self-justification (13%) and strategic behavior (5%). 
Focusing on the comments of sellers who scored high on the morality scale and 





“it’s a business and there isn’t much else to consider besides who gets the most money,” 
“because I think salespeople make more money,” or “I’m the seller, I should make more 
profit.”  This qualitative analysis suggests a relationship between self-justification and 
lying.  These responses came from sellers who scored high on the morality scale.  Research 
on distributive justice and entitlement has found that participants in economic experiments 
who find themselves as morally equal or morally superior to their counterparts are likely to 
come up with justifications for unfair behavior (Hoffman and Spitzer 1985).  The self-
justification responses found in this study follow a similar pattern. 
Conclusions 
This study contributes to the economics and marketing literature by taking a 
behavioral economics approach towards investigation honesty and trusting in asymmetric 
markets.  This is done by evaluating how seemingly trivial manipulations affect sellers’ 
honesty and buyers’ trusting.  In particular, the study evaluates how self-control, the 
chance of being caught lying, and the default option interact to affect participants in an 
artificial market with information asymmetry.   The results indicate that all of these 
conditions can interact to be effective in decreasing sellers’ dishonest behavior, albeit with 
some caveats.  When there is a 10% chance that sellers may be caught lying, a default truth 
increases honesty behavior in sellers, although this is only when self-control has been 
depleted.  If sellers’ self-control has been depleted, having a 10% chance of being caught is 
not enough deterrent to reduce lying, but self-control being depleted reduces lying when 
the default is truth.  When sellers have self-control available, lying is less likely.  In the 
scenario where self-control is available, being made aware that sellers may be caught lying 





caught lying, making the default option the truth, and self-control not depleted reduces the 
probability of sellers lying.  These main effects are moderated by the interactions between 
them but provide some guidance for future experiments that hope to reduce lying. 
These results have important practical applications.  In line with previous findings 
in other contexts having the potential for consequences (Saha and Poole 2000; Kübler, 
Müller, and Normann 2008), expressed in this study as a 10% chance of being caught 
lying, reduce dishonest behavior when self-control is available.  This suggests that in 
markets where information asymmetry exists buyers are less likely to be lied to when 
verification of the information is feasible.  An opportunity for future research is to explore 
whether the reduction in lying is monotonic on the probability of being caught in a lie.  
Another practical implication of the findings is that the default option being the truth 
helped reduce lying when self-control is available, indicating lying can be mitigated by a 
bias coming from the settings for opting out versus opting in.  An opportunity for future 
research is then further testing the opting out versus opting in setup under other scenarios.  
Finally, similar to the work of Kouchaki and Smith (2013), who find that less 
ethical behavior is observed in the morning versus the afternoon (an example of self-
control depletion), the study finds less ethical behavior is found when sellers have engaged 
in self-control depletion.  Sellers exposed to self-control depletion are less susceptible than 
their counterparts who were not exposed to self-control depletion to be nudged to be 
truthful.  Conversely, buyers exposed to self-control depletion are less likely to trust 
messages sent by the sellers than the control group.  This suggests that buyers in markets 





control depleted.  Future research can examine how self-control interacts with other 
deterrents of dishonesty to expand on the findings of this study. 
One more insight found in the results is that morality, as measured in this study, 
increases dishonest behavior.  This finding is counterintuitive.  A qualitative approach to 
the open-ended responses of sellers indicates that there may be a relationship between 
morality and lying that is nuanced by justifiability of behavior by sellers.  Previous 
research in social psychology has indicated that situations of this nature are feasible 
(Corcoran and Rotter 1987; Shu, Gino, and Bazerman 2011; Gino and Mogilner 2013), but 
this is not explored in this study. 
Engagement, as measured by CRT, plays an important role in honesty and trust.  
Sellers' tendency to lie decreases as their engagement with the task increases.  Buyers' lack 
of engagement induces them to trust the messages from sellers.  More research is necessary 
to disentangle the differences between these two mechanisms.  Numerical ability, on the 
other hand, does not affect honesty and trust.  This is comforting for highly specialized 
markets with information asymmetry that require numerical abilities (stock markets, 
derivatives, insurance, etc.).  Additional research is necessary using specialized markets to 
evaluate if there is an effect of numerical ability on honesty and trust. 
There are several limitations to the study.  One is the use of a student sample for 
the study.  Future research using nonstudent samples would make the results more robust 
and help with external validity.  An argument, however, could be made against this 
criticism.  The students in the study were willing to lie for a potential $1 increase in the 
payoff.  Real markets with information asymmetry offer incentives to lying greater than 





dishonest pricing can be much larger than $1, honesty patterns like the ones observed in 
the study would be expected.  The use of students, therefore, is not an insurmountable 
limitation but instead can be viewed as a minimum expectation of what would happen in 
real markets. 
A second limitation is the abstract nature of the experiment.  In the study, sellers 
are asked to send a message to the buyers anonymously through computers.  In real 
markets, often a product is sold not just by sending a message.  Instead, sellers have 
opportunities to negotiate, read non-verbal cues, and receive (almost) immediate feedback.  
Future research could extend the methodology to more realistic manipulations.  Another 
limitation is that the current study does not test the relationship between justification and 
morality empirically.  This is a limitation of this study that more research in economic 
contexts exploring this relationship could cover. 
The present study advances economic research by exploring boundaries to 
dishonest behavior in asymmetric markets.  By showing that nudges can decrease 
dishonesty, a more complete picture of the behavioral mechanisms behind dishonesty in 
asymmetric markets emerges.  Behavioral economics dis also advanced by showing how 
the behavior of buyers is impacted by self-control depletion.  The findings of the study 
illustrate how behavioral economics can contribute to shedding light on important and 









This dissertation takes advantage of merging different streams of research.  Using 
findings from the fields of stated preference, experimental economics, and marketing to 
study economic phenomena, the objective of this dissertation is to show how behavioral 
economics can be used to elicit candid responses in experiments designed to increase the 
understanding of economics.  This objective is achieved by designing and conducting two 
laboratory experiments that examine (1) how a different number of alternatives with the 
potential for consequences affects truthful responses, and (2) how behavioral nudges can 
be effective in moderating truth-telling in markets characterized by asymmetry 
information.  The results show candid responses may be obtained from participants in 
economic experiments with the proper incentive structure and adequate design.  In 
particular, the study described in Chapter II explores whether and how the number of 
alternatives with the potential for consequences has an effect on choice behavior in 
valuation studies for private goods, while the study in Chapter III sets out to find out how 
nudges, seemingly innocuous manipulations, can affect honesty and trust in a market with 
asymmetric information. 
Using Incentives in Discrete Choice Experiments 
When researching preferences, issues receiving a large amount of scrutiny are: 
whether participants’ revealed or stated preferences are consistent with their true 
preferences, whether their responses are candid, and whether these responses can be used 





al. 2018).  Previous research shows that revealed and stated preferences are similar under 
some circumstances (Haghani and Sarvi 2018).  There are competing findings, however, 
suggesting this may not always be the case (Lusk and Schroeder 2004; Levitt and List 
2007; Baltussen et al. 2012).  Several biases may come to play to generate inconsistencies 
between stated and revealed preferences, and research has come up with procedures such 
as cheap talk, honesty priming, and certainty scales that have been shown can help mitigate 
such biases to a certain degree (Fifer, Rose, and Greaves 2014).   
Given the evidence that there are differences between true preferences and 
responses given to questions without consequences, researchers interested in preferences 
have moved toward incentivized choice experiments to elicit truthful responses from 
participants (Brock and Durlauf 2001; Dong, Ding, and Huber 2010).  In incentivized 
choice experiments, one (or more) of the choices is (are) selected, generally at random, to 
be consequential (Vossler, Doyon, and Rondeau 2012).  Using such a mechanism where 
neither the experimenters nor the participants know a priori what outcome will be 
randomly picked provides an incentive for participants to provide truthful responses 
because of its consequences (Collins and Vossler 2009; Beck, Fifer, and Rose 2016).  The 
literature on stated preferences suggests the presence versus the absence of 
consequentiality leads to different outcomes (Carson, Groves, and List 2014), and some 
research goes further to propose that when participants know not all the decisions they 
make in a study are consequential, both the effort to understand and follow the procedures 
and the willingness to reveal their preferences are compromised (Yang, Toubia, and de 
Jong 2018).  The literature on incentivized choices proposes that the level of engagement 





that unengaged participants may be unwilling to exert the effort necessary to understand 
and follow experimental procedures (Bardsley 2005).   
With this in mind, the current practice in studies of valuation of private goods is to 
use incentivized choice experiments, where either all the choices are potentially 
consequential, or no choice is incentivized.  This is a challenge when preferences about 
products or features that do not exist are being evaluated, implying that some choices will 
be unavailable (Hoyos 2010; de Bekker-Grob, Ryan, and Gerard 2012).  With the existing 
literature on availability focusing on the effect of the existence or absence of products in 
the market (Batsell and Polking 1985; Raghavarao and Wiley 1994) and how to 
incorporate market availability into the marginal utility estimations of choice models 
(Anderson and Wiley 1992; Lazari and Anderson 1994), the influence of availability of 
alternatives and how the number of alternatives with the potential for consequences 
impacts the behavior of participants in experiments has not been addressed.  This is a gap 
the study presented in Chapter II addressed.   
Results indicate that, on average, the number of options with the potential for 
consequences does not improve the likelihood of optimal decision making.  When 
analyzing the results for large and small payoff differences between alternatives presented, 
however, the results show a different picture.  It is found that for large payoff differences 
any number of alternatives with the potential for consequences increases the likelihood of 
making the optimal decision.  In contrast, when the payoff differences are small, having 
any number of alternatives with the potential for consequences is not different from the 
scenario where no incentives exist in eliciting optimal responses from participants.  These 





in the task, resulting in better performance, even when not all alternatives present the 
potential for consequences.  Participants exhibiting better numerical ability do not make 
more profit-maximizing choices than participants with poorer skills, regardless of payoff 
differences.  In contrast, participants performed better as their level of engagement 
measured by their cognitive reflection score increased, even in the absence of incentives 
and regardless of the number of alternatives with potential for consequences, or payoff 
differences.  This finding highlights the importance of increasing the relevance of the task 
for participants, a topic that demands more research in experimental economics.  When 
payoff differences are large or participants are engaged by other means, there is a positive 
effect on the likelihood of making profit-maximizing choices.  Putting the findings 
together, a suggestion for practitioners is that if an incentivized design on all alternatives is 
not possible, then the measurement of engagement is recommended.  Further, even when 
not using an incentivized framework, researchers should aim their best to increase the 
engagement of participants, as this would help elicit preference revealing behavior.  The 
results suggest that one effective way to increase the engagement of participants with the 
task enlarging the difference in payoffs between alternatives. 
Using Nudges in Markets with Asymmetric Information 
Markets, the intersection of agents willing to transact and cooperate, are not exempt 
from the notion that in most cases, if not all, one party has more information about the 
transaction than the other.  Such a situation is referred to as asymmetric information 
(Mishra, Heide, and Cort 1998).  In markets with asymmetric information,  the party with 





asymmetric information is a natural occurrence in markets (Leland and Pyle 1977), it can 
lead to suboptimal outcomes, even leading markets to cease to exist (Akerlof 1970). 
In markets where asymmetric information occurs, the signals sent by the agents 
determine the trustworthiness of the exchange (Rothschild and Stiglitz 1978).  Therefore, 
sellers questioning the beliefs of their buyers and buyers questioning the honesty of the 
sellers are behavioral considerations of how the signals may be interpreted.  These 
concerns are reasonable, given research has shown that participants in economic 
experiments will lie for self-gain, even at the expense of others (Gneezy 2005; Mead et al. 
2009; Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi 2013).  Certain mechanisms such as repeat purchases 
(Rayo 2007), potential loss of future revenue (Grover and Goldberg 2010; Karp 2010), and 
the possibility of being caught (Bryant and Eckard 1991; Saha and Poole 2000), are 
deterrents to lying behavior by sellers.  On the other hand, fatigue and reduced self-control 
(Baumeister and Vohs 2007) are likely to increase dishonest behavior in sellers.  Given the 
potential of lying in markets with asymmetric information, an important research question 
is how to reduce lying in such circumstances.  The answer to this question has meaningful 
practical relevance, considering that markets for credence attributes – properties of goods 
or services that cannot be easily verified by the buyers (Darby and Karni 1973; Emons 
1997) – such as organic, local, etc, are an example of markets with information asymmetry 
that have been growing in size and economic value (Feagan and Morris 2009; Moser, 
Raffaelli, and Thilmany-McFadden 2011). 
The study in Chapter III takes a behavioral economics approach when investigating 
honesty and trusting in markets with asymmetric information.  This is accomplished by 





trusting behavior in a market with asymmetric information.  In this experimental market, 
participants are randomly paired and assigned arbitrarily the role of buyer or seller.  Each 
seller must make a one-line sales pitch to the buyer.  The results indicate that all of the 
conditions explored can be effective to decrease sellers’ dishonest behavior, with some 
limitations.  When sellers have their self-control depleted, a 10% chance they may be 
caught lying and making the default option the truth reduces lying in sellers.  When sellers 
have self-control available, however, being made aware that they may be caught lying 
decreases their likelihood to lie.  As a guideline for future research, including a chance of 
being caught lying, making the default being truthful, and not depleting the participants 
self-control will likely reduce lying in studies.  These effects are to be taken with caution, 
as the observed interactions between them moderate their individual effectiveness in 
reducing lying. 
Another behavioral insight found in the results of this study is that dishonest 
behavior increases with morality.  There may be a relationship between morality and lying 
that is impacted by sellers being able to justify their behavior.  While this is not fully 
explored in this study, social psychology research suggests this is feasible (Corcoran and 
Rotter 1987; Shu, Gino, and Bazerman 2011; Gino and Mogilner 2013).  More research in 
economic contexts exploring this relationship further is necessary. 
The numerical ability of participants has no distinct effect on the honesty of sellers 
and trusting of buyers.  Given the demand for numerical abilities in some real markets with 
asymmetric information (e.g. stock markets, derivatives, insurance, etc.) this is a 
comforting finding.  Meanwhile, just like in the availability of alternatives for 





trust.  Sellers lie less as their engagement increases.  Buyers trust sellers less as their 
engagement increases.  This once again highlights the importance of engaging participants 
and the relevance of the task for economic agents in experiments. 
Limitations and Recommendations for Further Research 
Different opportunities for future research stem from the studies’ limitations.  The 
first one common to both studies is that the samples used are not representative.  An 
argument could be made, however, that given the studies’ objectives representative 
samples are not necessary.  Future research could attempt to replicate the findings with a 
sample representative of the population.   
The studies in this dissertation use a limited number of factors to explain the 
behavior of participants.  Future research could consider other potential aspects of 
individual heterogeneity beyond the ones examined here.  Potential candidates include 
digging deeper into motivations, measures of prosocial behavior, and other dimensions of 
cognition.  Future research could also go deeper into the influence of participants’ 
attributes.  For example, the numeracy of participants is shown to affect performance.  
More research into how numerical abilities affect performance may shed light on whether 
there is an interaction between incentives and numeracy that affects performance.  A 
potentially fruitful avenue for further research is framing the results under expected utility, 
risk preferences, and decision making under uncertainty.  In both of the studies described 
in this dissertation, participants were making choices under uncertainty, but no information 
about the risk preferences of participants was gathered.  The findings of the studies are not 





potential confound.  Economic theory, however, could benefit from exploring the findings 
under this light. 
A third limitation common to both studies is the abstract nature of the experiments.  
The study used in Chapter II is a discrete choice experiment using colored shapes with 
different prices and potential profits.  In the vast majority of incentivized choice 
experiments and the real markets that they are used to investigate, actual goods with 
multidimensional attributes are used.  For the study described in Chapter III, sellers are 
asked to send a one-line sales pitch anonymously in a message to the buyers through 
computers.  In real markets, often a product is sold not just by sending a message.  Instead, 
sellers have opportunities to negotiate, read non-verbal cues, and receive (almost) 
immediate feedback.  Future research should use more realistic settings to explore the 
robustness of the findings. 
Results across both studies indicate that higher engagement leads to better 
performance even in the absence of incentives, a result that highlights the importance of 
how relevant the task is for participants.  How to increase engagement of participants and 
the relevance of the task would be a fruitful avenue for future research.  Finally, the 
studies’ bonus assignment and payment may not be salient enough to provide an incentive 
to respondents to become engaged enough to consider the best choice.  This is a challenge 
to experiments in general, given the monetary costs of conducting research.  Future 
research may want to examine the level of incentives necessary to engage participants. 
Concluding Remarks 
Research presented in this dissertation advances economic research by exploring 





engagement is as important as the number of alternatives with consequences in a valuation 
task, that nudges can increase honesty, that self-control depletion can increase dishonesty 
and mistrust, and that engagement plays a crucial role in economic decisions, a clearer 
picture of the behavioral mechanisms impacting decision-making emerges.  Findings 
illustrate behavioral economics can contribute to shedding light on important and 
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EXPERIMENTAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR STUDY USED IN CHAPTER II 
The purpose of today’s experiment is to help us understand purchasing decisions. 
To accomplish this purpose, you will be asked to select over a series of twelve items. I will 
explain how the experiment will work and we will have a practice round. After that, you 
will choose from the alternatives presented and then we will ask you to fill in a survey. 
After the survey has been completed, you will receive payment for your participation in 
today’s session. 
 
The experiment we will conduct today will probably be different from any 
experiment you have had experience with previously. In each slide, we will present you 
with two shapes of different colors and you will have to choose which shape to buy. For 
each circle you will get $1.50, for each triangle you will get $1.00 and for each square, you 
will get $0.50. As for the colors, green will pay you $0.50 and blue will pay you $1.00. 
The value of each shape is the combination of its shape and its color. You will buy this 
shape and profit from the value of the shape. The price for each shape/color combination is 
shown underneath the shape. The profit comes from subtracting the price from the value 
the shape and color give. 
 





In this experiment we want to know your preferences, so please just choose the one 
you prefer. If you decide you prefer one of the products, you do not have to pay the price, 
your choice will not affect your compensation. 
 
(For the binding treatment with all products available) 
This is a real experiment. All the alternatives shown are potentially binding. We 
will select one of the twelve rounds of colored shape pairs as binding and what you chose 
in that round will be your purchase. You will pay the stipulated price and in exchange, you 
will receive the respective payout. 
 
(For the binding treatment with not all products available) 
This is a real experiment, but not all options of colored shapes shown are available 
for purchase. Right now, you will randomly draw [eight/sixteen] cards with the shapes in 
the experiment from a box and we will place them in the tumbler on the desk. These are 
unknown to you and to us until the end of the experiment when we will select one of the 
twelve rounds as binding. What you chose in that round will be your purchase. If the 
alternative you chose is one of the cards in the tumbler, i.e. part of the [33/66] percent 
available, you will pay the stipulated price and in exchange, you will receive the payout. If 







COMPLETE SURVEY INSTRUMENT USED FOR STUDY IN CHAPTER II 
1. Please indicate your age in years:   __________ years  
 
2. Please indicate what gender you most identify with: 
a. ___ Female 
b. ___ Male 
c. ___ Other 
d. ___ Prefer not to answer 
 
3. Please indicate your ethnicity (select all that apply): 
a. ___ Hispanic, Latino or Spanish origin 
b. ___ White  
c. ___ Black/African American 
d. ___ American Indian or Alaskan Native 
e. ___ Asian Indian 
f. ___ Chinese 
g. ___ Filipino 
h. ___ Japanese 
i. ___ Korean 
j. ___ Vietnamese 
k. ___ Native Hawaiian 
l. ___ Gaumanian or Chamorro 
m. ___ Samoan 
n. ___ Other lease List: _______________________________________) 
 
4. Please indicate your family yearly income.  (Include all forms of income, including 
salary, interest and dividend payments, tips, scholarship support, student loans, 
parental support, social security, child support, and allowance). 














k. ___More than $150,000 
5. Imagine you roll a fair, six ‐sided die 1,000 times. Out of 1,000 rolls, how many 
times do you think the die would come up as an even number?
 _________times 
 
6. In the BIG BUCKS LOTTERY, the chances of winning a $10.00 prize are 1%. What 
is your best guess about how many people would win a $10.00 prize if 1,000 people 
each buy a single ticket from BIG BUCKS?  _____people 
 
7. If the chance of getting a disease is 20 out of 100, this would be the same as having 
a ____% chance of getting the disease. 
 
8. In the ACME PUBLISHING SWEEPSTAKES, the chance of winning a car is 1 in 
1,000. What percent of tickets of ACME PUBLISHING SWEEPSTAKES win a car?
 _____% 
 
9. If the chance of getting a disease is 10%, how many people would be expected to get 
the disease out of 1000? ______people 
 
10. A bat and a ball cost $11 in total. The bat costs $10 more than the ball. How much 
does the ball cost in dollars? $______ 
 
11. In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it takes 
52 days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take for the patch to 
cover half of the lake in days? ______days 
 
12. If it takes 10 machines 10 minutes to make 10 widgets, how long would it take 100 







LINEAR ROBABLITY MODELS 
Table D.1.  Linear Probability Model Estimation Results With Different 
Specifications 
   Model  
Variable 1 2 3 
Partially incentivized – low 0.599*** (0.023) 0.178*** (0.027) 0.034 (0.037) 
Partially incentivized – high 0.568*** (0.025) 0.196*** (0.028) 0.060 (0.036) 
Fully incentivized 0.578*** (0.026) 0.270*** (0.029) 0.098** (0.038) 
       
Numeracy score       
1   0.077 (0.052) 0.259*** (0.056) 
2   0.240*** (0.037) 0.260*** (0.036) 
3   0.294*** (0.033) 0.249*** (0.032) 
4   0.203*** (0.024) 0.128*** (0.025) 
5   0.187*** (0.023) 0.106*** (0.025) 
 
CRT score 
      
1   0.333*** (0.028) 0.328*** (0.029) 
2   0.271*** (0.024) 0.298*** (0.024) 
3   0.396*** (0.026) 0.374*** (0.027) 
       
TVD     0.038*** (0.012) 
Pupil dilation     0.026 (0.016) 
       
Demographics       
Age     -0.002** (0.001) 
Female      0.110*** (0.027) 
Hourly income     -0.001* (0.001) 
College Education     0.072 (0.068) 
       
N 1572 1572  1572  
Log-likelihood -1307.41  -1106.60  -1109.00  
AIC 2620.81  2235.20  2248.94  
BIC 2636.89  2294.16  2329.34  
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% is denoted by *, 







Table D.2.  Linear Probability Model Estimation Results for Different Payoffs 
  Model  
Variable Low Large 
Partially incentivized – low -0.028 (0.049) 0.105* (0.047) 
Partially incentivized – high 0.027 (0.049) 0.086 (0.048) 
Fully incentivized 0.048 (0.051) 0.156*** (0.050) 
     
Numeracy score     
1 0.266*** (0.072) 0.250*** (0.093) 
2 0.263*** (0.046) 0.258*** (0.067) 
3 0.238*** (0.042) 0.266*** (0.063) 
4 0.147*** (0.033) 0.097** (0.058) 
5 0.087*** (0.033) 0.129*** (0.060) 
     
CRT score     
1 0.333*** (0.039) 0.322*** (0.036) 
2 0.295*** (0.032) 0.296*** (0.031) 
3 0.372*** (0.036) 0.383*** (0.036) 
     
TVD 0.044*** (0.016) 0.019 (0.010) 
Pupil dilation 0.004 (0.029) 0.025 (0.027) 
     
Demographics     
Age -0.003** (0.002) -0.002 (0.002) 
Female 0.091** (0.036)  0.128*** (0.037) 
Hourly income -0.001 (0.001) -0.002* (0.001) 
College Education -0.100 (0.101) -0.081 (0.119) 
     
Constant 0.073 (0.166) 0.209 (0.179) 
     
N 917  655  
Log-likelihood -658.19  -432.98  
AIC 1348.38  897.96  
BIC 1425.52  969.72  
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance at the 10%, and 5% is 









COMPLETE SURVEY INSTRUMENT USED FOR STUDY IN CHAPTER III 
1. Please indicate your age in years:   __________ years  
 
2. Please indicate what gender you most identify with: 
a. ___ Female 
b. ___ Male 
c. ___ Other 
d. ___ Prefer not to answer 
 
3. Please indicate your ethnicity (select all that apply): 
a. ___ Hispanic, Latino or Spanish origin 
b. ___ White  
c. ___ Black/African American 
d. ___ American Indian or Alaskan Native 
e. ___ Asian Indian 
f. ___ Chinese 
g. ___ Filipino 
h. ___ Japanese 
i. ___ Korean 
j. ___ Vietnamese 
k. ___ Native Hawaiian 
l. ___ Gaumanian or Chamorro 
m. ___ Samoan 
n. ___ Other lease List: _______________________________________) 
 
4. Please indicate your family yearly income.  (Include all forms of income, including 
salary, interest and dividend payments, tips, scholarship support, student loans, 
parental support, social security, child support, and allowance). 














k. ___More than $150,000 
5. Imagine you roll a fair, six ‐sided die 1,000 times. Out of 1,000 rolls, how many 
times do you think the die would come up as an even number?
 _________times 
 
6. In the BIG BUCKS LOTTERY, the chances of winning a $10.00 prize are 1%. What 
is your best guess about how many people would win a $10.00 prize if 1,000 people 
each buy a single ticket from BIG BUCKS?  _____people 
 
7. If the chance of getting a disease is 20 out of 100, this would be the same as having 
a ____% chance of getting the disease. 
 
8. In the ACME PUBLISHING SWEEPSTAKES, the chance of winning a car is 1 in 
1,000. What percent of tickets of ACME PUBLISHING SWEEPSTAKES win a car?
 _____% 
 
9. If the chance of getting a disease is 10%, how many people would be expected to get 
the disease out of 1000? ______people 
 
10. A bat and a ball cost $11 in total. The bat costs $10 more than the ball. How much 
does the ball cost in dollars? $______ 
 
11. In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it takes 
52 days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take for the patch to 
cover half of the lake in days? ______days 
 
12. If it takes 10 machines 10 minutes to make 10 widgets, how long would it take 100 
machines to make 100 widgets in minutes? ______minutes 
 
13. Listed below are some characteristics that may identify a person: Caring, 
compassionate, fair, friendly, generous, helpful, hardworking, honest, kind. The 





visualize in your mind the kind of person that has these characteristics. Imagine, 
how that person would think, feel, and act. When you have a clear image of what 
this person would be like, move the sliders below to answer the questions. 
a. It would make me feel good to be a person who has these characteristics. 
b. Being someone who has these characteristics is an important part of who I 
am. 
c. I would be ashamed to be a person who has these characteristics. 
d. Having these characteristics is not really important to me. 
e. I strongly desire to have these characteristics. 
f. I often wear clothes that identify me as having these characteristics. 
g. The types of things I do in my spare time, e.g. hobbies, extra-curricular, 
clearly identify me as having these characteristics. 
h. The kinds of books and magazines I read identify me as having these 
characteristics. 
i. The fact that I have these characteristics is communicated to others by my 
membership in certain organizations. 
j. I am actively involved in activities that communicate to others that I have 
these characteristics. 
